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INTRODUCTION 
Since the attacks on September 11, New York’s subways, 
train stations, parks and tourist destinations have been 
prowled by police dogs—large, pointy-eared, unnervingly 
observant beasts deeply unconvinced of our innocence. They 
sniff at backpacks and train their eyes on passersby, daring 
us to make a move.
1
  
Until his retirement in 2011, Franky the Labrador 
Retriever worked as a drug-detection dog with the Miami-
Dade Police Department.2 Because Franky was a friendly 
animal, he was deployed extensively in airports, sports 
arenas, and other public places.3 During his seven-year 
tenure on the force, Franky sniffed out more than 2.5 tons of 
marijuana, 80 pounds of cocaine, and almost $5 million in 
drug-contaminated currency.4 Recently, Franky’s nose 
sparked a legal debate.5 In the fall of 2012, the United 
  
 1. Burkhard Bilger, Beware of the Dogs, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2012, at 47. 
 2. Curt Anderson, Decided By a Nose? Court Ponders Drug  
Dog’s Sniff, CHICAGO POST-TRIBUNE (Jan. 3, 2012, 2:24 PM), 
http://posttrib.suntimes.com/news/9794473-418/decided-by-a-nose-court-
ponders-drug-dogs-sniff.html. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Madison Gray, To Sniff or Not to Sniff? Supreme Court to Decide if 
Drug Dog’s Nose Went Too Far, TIME MAGAZINE (Jan. 10, 2012), 
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States Supreme Court heard oral argument in Florida v. 
Jardines, an appeal from a Florida Supreme Court decision 
holding Franky’s sniffs from the front door of a residence 
were a Fourth Amendment search.6  
Franky is not unique in any way.7 Thousands of dogs 
just like him work in police units across the country, 
constituting a new omnipresence in the modern surveillance 
state.8 These dogs have fundamentally altered the course of 
law enforcement in the United States, their widespread use 
ushering in a new model of policing.9 Counterbalancing this 
ubiquity is the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  
The courts have assumed different and, at times, 
contradictory approaches when considering whether or not 
to define the dog sniff as a Fourth Amendment search. Until 
now, these approaches have greatly depended upon the 
definition of dog sniffs as either a natural biological 
occurrence or an advancing technology.10 On one end, some 
courts have held that “a dog is not a technology—he or she 
is . . . a man’s best friend . . . [a] member[] of [the] family. 
  
http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/01/10/to-sniff-or-not-to-sniff-supreme-court-to-
decide-if-drug-dogs-nose-went-too-far/. 
 6. Jardines v. Florida, 73 So. 3d 34, 36-37 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. 
Ct. 995 (2012). 
 7. Matheson v. Florida, 870 So. 2d 8, 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“Law 
enforcement use of narcotics detection dogs has become commonplace.”). 
      8. See infra Part IV.B. 
 9. Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, How the War on Drugs Distorts Privacy Law, 
64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 131, 131 (May 9, 2012), 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/war-on-drugs-privacy-law. 
 10. For the definition of advancing technologies, see Brief for National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the American Civil Liberties 
Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5-6 Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-8508) (“Today, technology enables the authorities to 
breach secrecy without physical intrusion. At a minimum, a technological 
advance that is an effective substitute for physical intrusion and poses the same 
threats to privacy should be governed by the Fourth Amendment. A new device 
must be constrained by the Constitution whenever it enables officials to learn 
any confidential information that previously could have been learned only by 
means of physical intrusion.”); Id. at 23 (“[U]nfettered exploitation of tools made 
possible by science and technology could destroy constitutional liberties. The 
Court announced, and has since refined, a doctrine designed to protect Fourth 
Amendment freedoms against ever more powerful surveillance devices.”).  
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The same cannot be said of cars, blenders, and thermal 
images.”11 On the opposite end, certain other courts have 
held that “the officers’ use of a dog is not a mere 
improvement of their sense of smell, as ordinary eyeglasses 
improve vision, but is a significant enhancement 
accomplished by a different, and far superior, sensory 
instrument.”12 When perceived as an advancing technology, 
courts have been inclined to define dog sniffs as searches 
and are more likely to scrutinize them through the Fourth 
Amendment lens. Conversely, if the sniffs are perceived as a 
natural extension of the officer’s sense of smell, they are 
viewed with “superstitious awe”13 and are therefore unlikely 
to be defined as Fourth Amendment searches and to trigger 
constitutional protections.  
This Article draws on science and technology studies 
(STS) scholarship to claim that the courts’ dominant 
relationship to the police dog’s work relies on the tacit and 
problematic assumption of a nature/human dichotomy, such 
that the dog must be located on one side of this dichotomy 
or the other. Generally, STS scholarship moves away from 
technological determinism and social constructivism to a 
more systemic understanding of how technology and society 
coproduce each other—namely, how two or more variables 
in a system affect and, essentially, create each other.14 In 
determining whether certain intrusions amount to a search, 
the courts have relied on the now-discredited metaphysics of 
nature. By grounding their analysis in a nature/technology 
distinction, the courts import a series of satellite concepts—
autonomy, purity, stasis, etc.—into the search inquiry. 
  
 11. Fitzgerald v. Maryland, 864 A.2d 1006, 1015 (Md. 2004). 
 12. United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985) (citations 
omitted).  
 13. See Illinois v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636, 662 (Ill. 1994); Andrew E. Taslitz, 
Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog Scent Lineup, 42 
HASTINGS L.J. 15, 27-28 (1990). There is also a third way of perceiving the sniffs: 
as a low-level technology. When viewed from this perspective, the location from 
which the sniff was performed takes on heightened importance, as depicted 
later in the Article. See infra Part II.E. 
 14. Sheila Jasanoff, The Idiom of Co-production, in STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: 
THE CO-PRODUCTION OF SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 2-3 (Shelia Jasanoff, ed., 
2006); see Hans Harbers, Introduction: Co-production, Agency, and Normativity, 
in INSIDE THE POLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY: AGENCY AND NORMATIVITY IN THE CO-
PRODUCTION OF TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 11 (Hans Harbers ed., 2005).  
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Because the police dog enters legal discourse on the side of 
the natural, the very analytical structure employed assumes 
its inevitable outcome: where an officer’s use of an infrared 
detector would surely be a search, the same officer’s use of a 
police dog means no search has occurred, no search warrant 
is required, no suppression claim will lie, and no conviction 
will be reversed.  
Applying the insights of STS scholarship to K-9 sniffs, I 
contend that rather than placing the police dog in either the 
“nature” box or that of “technology,” it should be understood 
as existing in both realms—namely, as a “biotechnology,” a 
human-nature hybrid and coproduction. But beyond 
describing how this socio-legal magic works (“a dog is not a 
technology and therefore you will be incarcerated for seven 
years”), this Article also makes a few positive and 
normative claims. First, I claim that STS scholarship and 
contemporary literature on the politics of nature has 
rendered the nature/technology binary obsolete. Second, I 
argue that an accurate understanding of the cultural 
history and socialization of detection dogs precludes their 
designation as simply “natural.” Alongside their existence 
as living entities, detection dogs are also technologies in 
every relevant sense of the term.15 As artifacts, as historical 
developments with future potentialities, and as 
biotechnologies—police dogs are humanly crafted means to 
humanly formed ends and desires. The “bio” component in 
“biotechnology” refers to the dog’s aliveness, which does 
nothing to negate its technological aspects but rather 
strengthens them. I claim, in other words, that the 
Constitution and the practical realization of rights are being 
refabricated by many courts on the basis of a categorical 
error, plain and simple. 
This Article not only dismantles the nature/technology 
distinction, but also the division between animals and 
humans. Accordingly, my third normative claim is that the 
proper unit of constitutional analysis is not simply “the 
dog,” but the “dog-handler-trainer-breeder” assemblage. 
Acknowledging this will yield the “right” answer by the 
courts—namely, that although the police dog is a living and 
natural entity, it is also an advancing technology and, 
  
 15. The Oxford Dictionary defines technology as “the application of scientific 
knowledge for practical purposes.” CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1480 
(12th ed. 2011). 
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therefore, its sniffs should trigger all relevant Fourth 
Amendment protections, including a warrant, probable 
cause requirements, and remedies in case of a violation. 
Broadly, this Article is divided into two halves. The first 
half (Parts I–II) provides a detailed review of the relevant 
case law regarding dog sniffs from the Supreme Court and 
from lower courts, with a focus on the implicit and explicit 
relationship of these decisions to the categories of nature 
and technology. The second half (Parts III–VII) introduces 
and draws on STS scholarship about working animals to 
suggest that police dogs are “biotechnologies,” bred and 
trained for the purpose of drug detection and referred to 
interchangeably as nature and machines by their human 
coworkers.  
Specifically, Part I sketches the facts of Florida’s 
Jardines decision as well as other central United States 
Supreme Court cases that bear on the relationship of dogs 
to nature and technology. Part II explores these and other 
cases in more detail and also studies the oral arguments 
before the Supreme Court in the Jardines case on October 
31, 2012. These observations set the stage for the definition 
and discussion of “biotechnology” in Part III, which provides 
an analysis of how the STS literature has approached the 
topic of working animals. Part IV focuses on the history of 
dogs in human service and, specifically, in the service of war 
and detection. Moving from the general history of working 
dogs to the more specific history of breeding practices, Part 
V focuses on the discourse of pedigree improvement for dogs 
and on the methods and criteria for breeding police dogs. 
Part VI builds on the demonstrated relationship between 
breeding and technological advancement to explore in depth 
the particular institutional practices of breeding and 
cotraining police detection dogs in the United States. This 
part also examines the effects of the perceived infallibility of 
detection dogs. Finally, Part VII considers the police 
officers’ perception of detection dogs and the fused 
relationship between these dogs and machines. 
I. A JURISPRUDENCE OF SNIFFS: A REVIEW 
A. Franky Goes to Court 
On December 5, 2006, Miami-Dade police detectives and 
United States Drug Enforcement Administration agents set 
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up surveillance outside a house, after getting an anonymous 
tip that it contains a marijuana grow operation.16  
[Officer] Bartelt arrived with [canine] Franky and the two went 
up to the house, where Franky quickly detected the odor of pot at 
the base of the front door and sat down as he was trained to do 
[for a positive alert]. The sniff [of the house’s exterior] was used to 
get a search warrant from a judge. The house was searched and 
its lone occupant, Joelis Jardines, was arrested trying to escape 
out the back door. Officers pulled 179 live marijuana plants from 
the house, with an estimated street value of more than $700,000.
17
 
 Jardines was charged with marijuana trafficking.18 He 
was also charged with grand theft for the stolen electricity 
that was required to power the extensive marijuana 
operation.19 His attorney disputed the search. The sniff 
performed by Franky, Jardines’s lawyer argued, was “an 
unconstitutional law enforcement intrusion into the 
home.”20 The trial judge agreed and suppressed the evidence 
seized during the search, but an intermediate appeals court 
reversed this decision, concluding that “no illegal search 
occurred. The officer had the right to go up to [the] 
defendant’s front door.”21 The Florida Supreme Court in 
turn reversed the appeals court, ruling that: 
Such a public spectacle unfolding in a residential neighborhood 
will invariably entail a degree of public opprobrium, humiliation 
and embarrassment for the resident, for such dramatic 
government activity in the eyes of many—neighbors, passers-by, 
and the public at large—will be viewed as an official accusation of 
crime.
 
. . . [T]here is simply nothing to prevent the agents from 
applying the procedure in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner, 
or based on whim and fancy, at the home of any citizen.
22
  
  
 16. Anderson, supra note 2. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Jardines v. Florida, 73 So. 3d 34, 38 (Fla. 2011). 
 19. Id. at 37.  
 20. Anderson, supra note 2. 
 21. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 38. 
 22. Id. at 49. Florida’s Supreme Court decision applies only to dog sniffs 
conducted outside houses. As one scholar notes: 
The court did not invalidate warrantless dog sniffs outside other types 
of homes, such as apartments. In fact, the court distinguished Stabler v. 
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Jardines has generated considerable attention, 
including several amici curiae briefs filed by various states 
and organizations in support of Florida’s petition.23 The case 
is also being closely monitored by law enforcement agencies 
nationwide, which depend on dogs for a wide variety of their 
everyday work.24 “If the Florida Supreme Court’s decision is 
upheld,” warns an amicus curiae brief in support of Florida, 
“it could have a profound chilling effect on law-enforcement 
efforts to combat illegal drugs.”25 The brief concludes by 
stating that “[t]he Court should instead reverse the 
judgment below to ensure that detection dogs retain their 
  
[Florida] (which held that a dog sniff conducted at an apartment door 
was not a search) on the ground that an apartment is a “temporary 
dwelling,” and not accorded the same status as a genuine “private 
residence.”  
Joseph Magrisso, Protecting Apartment Dwellers from Warrantless Dog Sniffs, 
66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1133, 1144 (2012); see Stabler v. Florida, 990 So. 2d 1258, 
1261, 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), rev’d, 90 So. 3d 267 (Fla. 2012).  
 23. Several Amici Curiae briefs were filed in support of petitioner Florida. 
See, e.g., Brief for National Police Canine Association and Police K-9 Magazine 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Florida v. Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995 
(2012) (No. 11-564); Briefs for the States of Texas, Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, 
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Florida v. Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995 
(2012) (No. 11-564); Brief for United States as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Florida v. Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995 (2012) (No. 11-564); Brief for 
Wayne County, Michigan as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Florida v. 
Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995 (2012) (No. 11-564). On the other hand, the case of 
Harris v. Florida, 71 So. 3d 756 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012), 
had less briefs filed in support of the state. See, e.g., Brief for Virginia, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, Texas, and Utah as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Florida v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012) 
(No. 11-817); Brief for National Police Canine Association and Police K-9 
Magazine as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner Florida v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 
1796 (2012) (No. 11-817); see infra Part II.A (discussing Harris). 
 24. Anderson, supra note 2. 
 25. Brief for the States of Texas, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9 Florida v. Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995 
(2012) (No. 11-564).  
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proper place at the forefront of state and federal efforts 
against the production and distribution of illegal drugs.”26  
B. Prior Supreme Court Sniff Cases 
In its petition to the United States Supreme Court, 
Florida argued that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision 
conflicts with numerous previous rulings by the Court—
United States v. Place in particular—all holding that a dog 
sniff is not a search.27 In Place, DEA agents detained a man 
at an airport and used a trained narcotics dog to perform a 
sniff test on his luggage.28 The Court explained that 
although a brief seizure of the man’s luggage was 
appropriate, the officers could not conduct a full search of 
this luggage without probable cause.29 However, the Court 
held that the sniff test at issue was not a search under the 
Fourth Amendment because it did not involve opening or 
otherwise exposing noncontraband items to public view, and 
because it was specifically designed to reveal the presence of 
contraband.30 The Court also held that the dog sniff was sui 
generis.31 I will return to this decision in the next part of 
this Article. 
Over a decade later, in Illinois v. Caballes, the Supreme 
Court again upheld the use of a dog sniff test, this time in 
the context of an automobile search.32 The majority opinion 
reinforced the Court’s conclusion in Place that an 
investigatory technique that only reveals illegal conduct is 
not a search under the Fourth Amendment because an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in such 
conduct.33 Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion that 
  
 26. Id. 
 27. 462 U.S. 696 (1983); Brief for Petitioner at 3 Florida v. Jardines, 73 So. 3d 
34 (2011) (No. 11-564).  
 28. Place, 462 U.S. at 699. 
 29. Id. at 706. 
 30. Id. at 707. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). 
 33. See id.; see also Place, 462 U.S. at 707. The reasonable expectation of 
privacy test was set forth by the Supreme Court in its decision Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967). There, the Court considered whether police 
use of an electronic listening device attached to the exterior of a public phone 
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observed the dangerous precedent established by the 
majority’s judgment. In her words, “[t]he Court has never 
removed police action from Fourth Amendment control on 
the ground that the action is well calculated to apprehend 
the guilty.”34  
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Souter argued 
that the sui generis treatment of the dog sniff test by the 
Court is based on the faulty assumption that the sniff test is 
infallible, and that it therefore could not expose legal 
conduct or property.35 Souter argued, by contrast, that “[t]he 
infallible dog . . . is a creature of legal fiction.”36 Although 
this argument did not persuade a majority of the Justices in 
the automobile context, it remains to be seen whether the 
current Supreme Court can be convinced that a sniff test of 
a home crosses an important Fourth Amendment line. The 
Jardines case will thus provide the Court with the 
opportunity to consider whether its previous dog sniff 
decisions apply equally in the context of the home, which 
has traditionally enjoyed heightened Fourth Amendment 
protections.37  
  
booth to overhear Katz’s telephone conversations amounted to a search. See id. 
at 348, 350. Shifting from its previous focus on physical trespasses into private 
property, the Court announced that the “Fourth Amendment protects people, 
not places” and established the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. Id. at 
351, 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan’s concurring opinion outlined a two-
pronged test for deciding the reasonableness of privacy expectations: “[F]irst, 
that a person . . . exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is willing to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’” Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court made note of Katz in 
Illinois v. Caballes: “When an officer observes an object left by its owner in plain 
view, no search occurs because the owner has exhibited ‘no intention to keep 
[the object] to himself.’” 543 U.S. at 416 n.6.  
 34. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 35. Id. at 411-13 (Souter, J., dissenting); Concerning the Fourth Amendment 
Implications of a Police Dog Sniff at the Front Door of a Suspect’s Home, 
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER (Jan. 19, 2012, 11:13 AM), 
http://epic.org/amicus/jardines/default.html. 
 36. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411.  
 37. See Leslie A. Lunney, Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?: 
Unreasonable Expansion of Canine Sniff Doctrine To Include Sniffs Of the 
Home, 88 OR. L. REV. 829, 890-93 (2009) (discussing the conflict between 
recognizing dogs as technology or finding that detection dogs are not advanced 
technology) (Lunney is now known as Leslie Shoebotham); see also California v. 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not 
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C. Does Geography Matter? From the Home to the Airport 
via the Car 
In a major ruling from 2001, the Supreme Court 
concluded “that police could not use thermal imaging 
technology to detect heat from marijuana grow operations 
from outside a home because the equipment could also 
detect lawful activity.”38 “We have said that the Fourth 
Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the 
house,’” the Court ruled in Kyllo v. United States.39 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Scalia noted that the thermal 
device could detect such intimate details as “at what hour 
each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and 
bath.”40 Also in Kyllo, Justice Scalia first introduced the 
“general public use” test, implying that the government may 
use technologies that are in general public use to conduct a 
warrantless search of a home.41 
  
extend to “public navigable airspace”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 505 (1983) 
(holding that it would be “feasible to investigate the contents of . . . bags in a 
more expeditious way” through the use of drug-sniffing dogs); Abigail Brown, 
Something Smells Afoul: An Analysis of the End of a District Court Split, 36 
NOVA L. REV. 201, 206, 220 (2011) (arguing that Kyllo should not be applied to a 
dog-sniff case and raising questions about whether a dog is a technology, 
whether a dog is in public and general use, and whether a dog sniff is a physical 
intrusion of a home). 
 38. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 40 (2001); Anderson, supra note 2. 
 39. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (2001) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 
(1980)).  
 40. Id. at 29, 38; see also Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a Woman?, 97 GEO. L.J. 485, 
487-89 (2009) (critiquing the “lady of the house” test set forth in Kyllo as being 
problematically paternalistic).  
 41. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing 
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in 
question is not in general public use.”) (citations omitted). For criticisms of this 
test, see id. at 46-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Despite the Court’s attempt to 
draw a line that is ‘not only firm but also bright,’ the contours of its new rule are 
uncertain because its protection apparently dissipates as soon as the relevant 
technology is ‘in general public use.’ Yet how much use is general public use is 
not even hinted at by the Court’s opinion, which makes the somewhat doubtful 
assumption that the thermal imager used in this case does not satisfy that 
criterion. In any event, putting aside its lack of clarity, this criterion is 
somewhat perverse because it seems likely that the threat to privacy will grow, 
rather than recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily 
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Jardines will provide the Supreme Court with the 
opportunity to articulate two alterations in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.42 First, the Court might expand 
the trespass rationale recently articulated by Justice Scalia 
in United States v. Jones.43 There, the Court held that 
federal authorities’ attachment of a Global Positioning 
System (GPS) device to a vehicle, and its use to monitor the 
vehicle’s movements for twenty-eight days, was a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.44 The Court explained that 
the “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-
law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th 
century.”45 With this historical foundation in mind, the 
  
available.”) (citations omitted); see also Ken Lammers, Canine Sniffs: The 
Search That Isn’t, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 845, 852-53 (2005) (distinguishing 
between Caballes and Kyllo in the context of dog sniffs); Lunney, supra note 37, 
at 855. Lunney argues that “canine sniffs of the home are ‘searches’ within the 
Fourth Amendment and, similar to the thermal imager warrants required after 
Kyllo, must be supported by a dog sniff warrant.” Id. at 834. The author also 
suggests that courts that focus only on the illegality of the item misapply Kyllo’s 
standard. Id. at 867-68. She notes that Kyllo distinguished between advancing 
and routine technology, holding that a warrant is not required when the routine 
technology is in general public use. See id. at 900-01. Lunney then determines 
that “[a] canine sniff of the home is problematic both because of its intrusiveness 
and because it implicates the privacy concerns expressed in Kyllo. Therefore, a 
canine home-sniff is a ‘search’ under the Fourth Amendment and must be 
treated accordingly.” Id. at 902. My argument in this Article is very much in line 
with Lunney’s, except mine offers a broad analysis of the inseparability of 
nature and technology and relies on interdisciplinary literature. 
 42. See Bambauer, supra note 9, at 131.  
 43. 132 S. Ct. 945, 952-53 (2012). 
 44. Id. at 948-49. Justice Scalia’s opinion explains that the Fourth 
Amendment was intended to protect against government trespass upon physical 
areas, limited to “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” Id. at 949. The use of a 
GPS tracker on a vehicle to monitor the vehicle on public roadways constituted 
a search because of its intrusion on an “effect” rather than an unprotected 
physical entity. Id. at 950. The government physically trespassed into the 
defendant’s private property for the purpose of obtaining information. Id. at 
951-52. 
 45. Id. at 949-50 (citations omitted); see also id. at 950 (“[F]or most of our 
history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern 
for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it 
enumerates.”) (citations omitted); id. at 951 n.5 (“A trespass on ‘houses’ or 
‘effects,’ or a Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone a search unless it is done to 
obtain information; and the obtaining of information is not alone a search unless 
it is achieved by such a trespass or invasion of privacy.”).  
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Court reasoned that federal agents had “encroached on a 
protected area” of Jones’s vehicle when attaching the GPS 
device.46 Thus, the installation of the GPS amounted to a 
“classic trespassory search” under the Fourth Amendment.47 
A favorable outcome for Jardines would reinforce the notion 
that, despite the lack of physical trespass in this case, and 
because “the home is a formidable privacy fortress,” all 
information contained within its walls should be protected 
“from government detection unless that information is 
knowingly exposed to the public.”48 Such a favorable 
outcome would expand Jones’s narrow trespass grounds and 
reinstate Katz.49  
Second, Jardines will provide the Supreme Court with 
the opportunity to revisit its previous dog sniff decisions, 
mainly United States v. Place and Illinois v. Caballes.50 
These cases have protected dog sniffs from constitutional 
scrutiny by holding that sniffs of luggage and vehicles, 
respectively, did not constitute searches.51 The reasoning 
behind both holdings is simple: because the dog sniff can 
disclose only the presence or absence of illegal narcotics, “a 
search incident to a dog’s [positive] alert cannot offend 
reasonable expectations of privacy,”52 mostly because society 
should not be willing to recognize such privacy interests.53 
Specifically, in Caballes, the Court found that the use of a 
  
 46. Id. at 952. 
 47. Id. at 954. 
 48. Bambauer, supra note 9, at 131. 
 49. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 42 (2001) (citations omitted) 
(explaining that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his 
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection”). 
 50. Bambauer, supra note 9, at 131 (citations omitted). 
 51. Id. at 131; see David A. Sklanski, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and 
Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 150 (2002) (“[I]nvestigative tactics that are not 
deemed searches or seizures escape judicial review altogether under the Fourth 
Amendment.”).  
 52. Bambauer, supra note 9, at 131. 
 53. Namely, this pertains to the objective prong in Katz. Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Sklanksi explains that the 
Court tends to rely more on the objective prong of the Katz test because of the 
odd consequences that transpire from relying on the subjective prong. Sklanski, 
supra note 51, at 157 (explaining that the subjective prong “has the odd 
consequence that people who suspect the government are spying on them may 
lose, for that every reason, much of their protection against what they fear”). 
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trained narcotics dog subsequent to a lawful traffic stop did 
not infringe on the expectation of privacy protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.54 In a concurring opinion in Place, 
Justice Blackmun argued that a dog sniff could be 
considered a “minimally intrusive” search and justified in 
certain circumstances based on the already-existing 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.55 His rationale was 
that because a suspicion already exists that the suspect has 
contraband, there is less likelihood of a false alert by the 
dog.56 
D. Criticisms of the Supreme Court’s Sniff Jurisprudence  
The narrow test prescribed by the Supreme Court in 
Place57 (and, subsequently, in Caballes58) has been subject to 
extended criticism. One such criticism is that using canine 
sniffs as investigative techniques may threaten individual 
liberties, and that they are not sufficiently guarded by 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.59 Another critique of 
Place is that it ignored the context of the search and did not 
acknowledge the differences between sniffs of a person and 
sniffs of an object.60 Place dealt with an object (luggage) and 
not a person, which might explain this decision.61 Still 
others have criticized Place’s interpretation of privacy, 
arguing that odors can be highly intimate and that dogs 
often engender anxiety and fear.62 Finally, critics have 
  
 54. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005); cf. George M. Dery III, Who 
Let the Dogs Out? The Supreme Court Did in Illinois v. Caballes by Placing 
Absolute Faith In Canine Sniffs, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 378 (2006).  
 55. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 723 (1983) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409. 
 59. See, e.g., Amanda S. Froh, Rethinking Canine Sniffs: The Impact of Kyllo 
v. United States, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 337, 354 (2002–2003). 
 60. Id. at 354. 
 61. Id. at 353-54. 
 62. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“A drug-detection 
dog is an intimidating animal.”); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a 
Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1246-47 (1983) (“[T]he 
very act of being subjected to a body sniff by a German Shepherd may be 
offensive at best and harrowing at worst to the innocent sniffee.”); Jon S. 
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pointed out that police dogs often alert when drugs are not 
present, resulting in unnecessary and suspicionless 
searches.63 Along these lines, Jane Yakowitz Bambauer 
argues that what is “[c]uriously missing from any Supreme 
Court opinion is a reflection on how contraband-detecting 
dogs fundamentally change law enforcement” in the United 
States.64 Although “[p]olice dogs are old technology, their 
widespread use ushers in a new model of policing,” she 
argues.65 She also notes that “[l]ike pattern-based data 
mining, dog sniffs produce tradeoffs inherent in dragnet-
style law enforcement. They redistribute the burden of 
unproductive searches from the few-but-stereotypically 
‘suspicious’ to the entire population.”66 
  
Vernick et al., Technologies to Detect Concealed Weapons: Fourth Amendment 
Limits on a New Public Health and Law Enforcement Tool, J.L. MED. & ETHICS, 
Dec. 2003, at 567, 571 (“‘[T]he body and its odors are highly personal’ and ‘dogs 
often engender irrational fear.’”) (citation omitted); see also Timothy C. Stone, 
State v. Rabb: Dog Sniffs Close to Home, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1123, 1145 n.12 
(2006) (noting that dog sniffs can be “intrusive”).  
 63. Froh, supra note 59, at 355.  
 64. Bambauer, supra note 9, at 131. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Bambauer, supra note 9, at 131-32; see also Robert Bird, An Examination 
of the Training and Reliability of the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 KY. L.J. 405, 
430-31 (1997). Bird’s analysis can serve to explain Bambauer’s dense statistical 
statement in the main text. In his words:  
The use of statistical analysis reveals that even a very high accuracy 
rate can produce an unreasonable amount of false positives under 
certain conditions [in a random population]. . . . [S]uccessful canines 
will have difficulty establishing high accuracy rates on their own, and 
will likely be most successful when used in tandem with the suspicions 
of law enforcement. Therefore, narcotics detection dogs are most 
reliable against an individual item or person where police first 
suspected the presence of narcotics before using the drug dog. During 
such a search, the relevant population sniffed will already have been 
narrowed by police expertise. Traffic stops, questioning of suspicious 
individuals, and examinations of suspect packages exemplify this type 
of narrowing, and courts should more readily rely on dog alerts in these 
settings. Canines are less reliable when police use less of their own 
expertise. This reasoning applies to sniffs directed at a suspicious 
locale, such as an airport or border crossing, rather than a person or 
item. These sniffs retain some qualities of individualization: police are 
monitoring suspicious areas. However, the dogs are sniffing in a 
somewhat random manner and searching for narcotics over a large 
area. Here, courts should accept only well-trained canines as reliable 
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Congruent with this line of critique, I contend that the 
Supreme Court’s sniff jurisprudence is grounded in a 
cultural, historical, and conceptual misconception. Although 
it does so only implicitly, the Supreme Court essentially 
relates organic beings and artificial technologies as two 
independent and dichotomous categories: one strongly 
situated in nature, the other in society.67 This 
nature/culture schism translates into the judicial realm as 
follows. On the one hand, that which is natural is 
constructed by the Court as less invasive, less 
sophisticated,68 and having less of a “creeping” potential.69 
  
drug detectors because the sheer number of items examined can trigger 
unacceptable false alerts. 
Id. at 427, 430 (citations omitted). The importance of teamwork for successful 
detection supports my claim in this Article that the dog does not operate 
independent of human influence and that, at the very least, this human 
influence should be subject to judicial scrutiny. 
 67. See infra Part II.D; see, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Florida v. 
Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995 (2012) (No. 11-564) [hereinafter “Transcript of Oral 
Argument, Jardines”] (“So you have to treat him like a guy, to think that he is 
not like technology in terms of augmenting what a human being can do.”).  
 68. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012); Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35-36 (2001) (“Reversing that approach would leave 
the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology. . . . [T]he rule we adopt 
must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in 
development.”); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 142 (1984) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he use of techniques like the dog sniff at issue in Place 
constitutes a search. . . . The same would be true if a more technologically 
sophisticated method were developed to take the place of the dog.”); United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“[A] canine sniff. . . . is much less 
intrusive than a typical search”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Transcript 
of Oral Argument, Jardines, supra note 67, at 17-18 (“[T]his isn’t a case where if 
you allow a dog to sniff today, he might use x-ray vision in the future. That’s not 
going to happen.”). 
 69. The term “surveillance creep” was first used by the Weberian French 
sociologist and legal scholar Jacques Ellul. See JACQUES ELLUL, THE 
TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1964). Ellul points to what he calls “la technique”: a 
cultural orientation toward means rather than ends, which makes the insertion 
into social life of many artifacts and technical processes seem desirable. La 
technique is already an “unnatural” construct, but it is characteristic of human 
society rather than simply industrial society: “technique is absorbed into man’s 
psychology and depends upon that psychology and upon what has been called 
technical motivation.” Id. La technique “constructs the social world that the 
machine needs, feeding on itself and expanding in an all-embracing and usually 
irreversible fashion.” See also DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 
52 (2007) (“Ellul was among one of the first to note the effects of technologized 
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Therefore, this practice is usually deemed a nonsearch that 
does not trigger Fourth Amendment protections.70 On the 
other hand, that which is labeled an advancing technology—
for example, the infrared machine in Kyllo71 or the GPS 
device in Jones72—is depicted by the Court as actually or 
potentially invasive and thus in need of checks, balances, 
and regulation.73 Along these lines, the Supreme Court has 
incorrectly insinuated that police dogs are organic creatures 
that are familiar and familial.74 Implicit in this paradigm is 
the reasoning that a dog, even when performing the same 
task as a nonorganic device, is actually doing something 
different; it is simply performing its natural, God-given75 
thing: breathing.76 The machine, on the other hand, is 
perceived as an estranged “other” constructed by humans 
and, as such, triggering a range of Fourth Amendment 
  
policing; it requires that more and more be supervised in the hope of 
apprehending more effectively those who violate the rules and laws. La 
technique in police work steadily and increasingly puts everyone under subtle 
surveillance.”). Lyon draws on Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari to characterize 
surveillance creep as “rhizomic; more like a creeping plant than a central tree 
trunk with spreading branches.” See David Lyon, Surveillance After September 
11, SOC. RES. ONLINE 6.3, 2001. 
 70. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (“[T]he use of a well-trained 
narcotics-detection dog . . . generally does not implicate legitimate privacy 
interests.”) 
 71. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34. 
 72. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962-63 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 73. See id. at 962 (implying that Katz is not sufficiently capable of addressing 
the dangers and complexities of advanced technology cases and speculating that 
“concern about new intrusions on privacy may spur the enactment of legislation 
to protect against these intrusions”).  
 74. Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 719 (1983) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (suggesting that dog sniffs are at least as intrusive as certain 
electronic detection devices but stating that “[o]bviously, a narcotics detection 
dog is not an electronic detection device”). 
 75. The argument of the canine as a God-given entity was stressed repeatedly 
by counselor for the state in the Jardines arguments. See infra note 172 and 
accompanying text. 
 76. Florida v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d 1, 5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), cert. granted, 
132 S. Ct. 995 (2012) (noting that “[a] dog's nose is not, however, a ‘device,’” and 
suggesting that this is the reason why dog sniffs are considered sui generis). 
This also explains why the petitioner in Jardines repeatedly characterizes the 
dog sniff as “breathing” or obtaining information “merely by breathing.” Brief of 
Petitioner at 14, 21, 28 Florida v. Jardines, 132 S Ct. 995 (2012) (No. 11-564). 
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protections.77 Counter to such reasoning, this Article argues 
that the contraband detector dog is both natural and 
breathing and also very much a sophisticated and 
increasingly advancing technology, produced by humans for 
human ends.  
E. Jacobsen’s “Yes/No” Scope 
At this stage, I would like to pause on the facts and 
decision in United States v. Jacobsen.78 Although this case 
involved a chemical test rather than a dog sniff, the Court 
nonetheless applied the logic of Place in its ruling.79 Of all 
Supreme Court cases, Jacobsen most clearly brings to light 
the slippery slope—the interchangeability, even—between 
K-9s and mechanical surveillance techniques.  
In Jacobsen, federal drug enforcement agents were 
alerted by private freight workers to a parcel, consisting of a 
cardboard box wrapped in brown paper, which contained a 
tube made of duct tape.80 The workers had opened the tube 
to reveal plastic bags of white powder.81 The agents, who 
had later arrived to the scene, removed one of the bags, 
opened it, and performed a field test that identified the 
substance as cocaine.82 The Court found the removal of the 
contents of the package by the agents was reasonable83 and 
that the chemical field test was not a search.84 The Court 
also found United States v. Place to be controlling and 
analogous, stating that the chemical test, just like the dog 
sniff, only revealed whether contraband was present.85 “It 
could tell [the officer] nothing more, not even whether the 
  
 77. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 137-38 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 78. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 109 (1984); see also Fitzgerald v. 
Maryland, 864 A.2d 1006, 1011-12 (discussing Jacobsen and City of Indianapolis 
v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)). 
 79. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121-23. 
 80. Id. at 111. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 112. 
 83. Id. at 121-23.  
 84. Id. at 124-25 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)). 
 85. Id. at 122. 
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substance was sugar or talcum powder,” the Court 
explained.86 The Court then held that due to the test’s 
narrow scope, it “does not compromise any legitimate 
interest in privacy.”87  
More broadly, Jacobsen held that there is no privacy 
interest in contraband: “Congress has decided . . . to treat 
the interest in ‘privately’ possessing cocaine as illegitimate; 
thus governmental conduct that can reveal whether a 
substance is cocaine, and no other arguably ‘private’ fact, 
compromises no legitimate privacy interest.”88 The Court 
rejected Jacobsen’s attempt to distinguish Place on a theory 
that the physical examination of his effects was more of an 
intrusion than the dog’s exterior sniff, stating that “the 
reason [Place’s sniff] did not intrude upon any legitimate 
privacy interest was that the governmental conduct could 
reveal nothing about noncontraband items. That rationale 
is fully applicable here.”89 Read together, Place and 
Jacobsen establish that there is no search when government 
officials are legally present in a location, and when 
government action reveals only whether contraband is 
present or not. This rationale is also the state’s central 
argument in the pending case of Jardines: Franky’s sniff 
“detects only contraband and because one does not have a 
‘legitimate’ privacy interest in contraband, a dog sniff is not 
a search under the Fourth Amendment.”90 
The dissent’s opinion in Jacobsen is as important for my 
purposes as that of the majority. In their dissent, Justices 
Brennan and Marshall warned that the Place Court “was 
dangerously incorrect,” and that the majority’s reasoning in 
Jacobsen “is fundamentally misguided and could potentially 
lead to the development of a doctrine wholly at odds with 
  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 123.  
 88. Id. This test is in line with the Court’s statement that “the ‘reasonable 
person’ test presupposes an innocent person.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 
438 (1991).  
 89. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124 n.24.  
 90. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9, 11, Florida v. Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 
995 (No. 11-564); see also United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 
2005) (“[T]he majority of our sister circuits . . . have held that canine sniffs used 
only to detect the presence of contraband are not Fourth Amendment 
searches.”). 
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the principles embodied in the Fourth Amendment.”91 In the 
dissent’s words: 
Combining this approach with the blanket assumption, implicit in 
Place and explicit in this case, that individuals in our society have 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the fact that they have 
contraband in their possession, the Court adopts a general rule 
that a surveillance technique does not constitute a search if it 
reveals only whether or not an individual possesses contraband.
92
  
A crucial component of the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
Place and Jacobsen is their focus on the limited scope and 
nature of the test93—rather than on the nature of the object 
tested—in determining whether a legitimate privacy 
interest exists.94 Such a conclusion is supported by City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond.95 While holding a highway 
checkpoint program designed to discover and interdict 
illegal narcotics unconstitutional, the Supreme Court noted 
that the program’s use of dogs to sniff the outside of 
automobiles was in fact constitutional.96 The Court wrote:  
Just as in Place, an exterior sniff of an automobile does not 
require entry into the car and is not designed to disclose any 
information other than the presence or absence of narcotics. Like 
the dog sniff in Place, a sniff by a dog that simply walks around a 
car is “much less intrusive than a typical search.”
97
  
The three dissenting justices in Edmond agreed with the 
majority that, “[w]e have already held, however, that a ‘sniff 
test’ by a trained narcotics dog is not a ‘search’ within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it does not 
require physical intrusion of the object being sniffed and it 
does not expose anything other than the contraband 
  
 91. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id. at 137. 
 93. This is also referred to as the “limited disclosure theory.” See Stone, supra 
note 62, at 1125 n.13.  
 94. See Froh, supra note 59, at 343-47 (suggesting two situations in which “no 
search” exists: when there is no reasonable expectation of privacy or the 
intrusion is limited). 
 95. 531 U.S. 32, 47-48 (2000).  
 96. Id. at 40, 48. 
 97. Id. at 40 (citations omitted). 
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items.”98 Both the majority and the dissent in Edmond thus 
focused on the narrow “yes/no” scope of the sniff rather than 
on the identity of the sniffed object—the exterior of the 
luggage in Place and the car in Edmond.99 The only relevant 
spatial determination by the Court involved whether or not 
the dog was legally present outside the sniffed object.100 
This Part reviewed the relevant Supreme Court 
decisions that apply to dog sniffs. Although the Court did 
not explicitly analyze the status of dogs from a nature 
versus culture perspective, this dichotomy underscores its 
K-9 decisions. The next Part will focus on lower court 
decisions on dog sniffs, which more boldly and explicitly 
discuss the nature versus culture status of this creature.  
  
 98. Id. at 40; id. at 52-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983)). 
 99. This idea has also been referred to as the “binary search doctrine.” See 
Constitutional Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 169, 179, 185-86 (2005). The term 
“binary” was first used in United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 
1989), where the court stated: “[a]s in Place, the driving force behind Jacobsen 
was the recognition that because of the binary nature of the information 
disclosed by the sniff, no legitimately private information is revealed . . . .”; see 
also Chris Blair, Illinois v. Caballes: Love Affair With a Drug-Sniffing Dog, 41 
TULSA L. REV. 179, 179-80, 187-90 (2005) (describing the case of Illinois v. 
Caballes and arguing that the Court’s analysis of dog sniffs in that case has led 
to a far-reaching conclusion about reasonable expectations of privacy); Ric 
Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How to Make 
the World Safe for Binary Searches, 80 TUL. L. REV. 411, 413-14 (2005) 
(explaining the Fourth Amendment’s binary search doctrine, including the 
decision in Illinois v. Caballes, and identifying two questions that the Court 
“forgot” to answer: what types of surveillance qualify as binary searches and 
what limits should be placed on such searches).  
 100. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40-41. More generally, the dissent notes that the 
past decisions of Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) and 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) stand for the notion that 
suspicionless roadblock seizures are only constitutional if done according to a 
plan that limits officer discretion when conducting the stops. Edmond, 531 U.S. 
at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissent notes that the past two 
cases may have been incorrectly decided because the framers would not have 
considered indiscriminate stops of random people to be reasonable. Id. 
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II. THE DOG: A MAN’S BEST FRIEND—OR A TECHNOLOGY? 
A. Back to Jardines and Harris 
The two recent Florida Supreme Court cases, Jardines 
v. Florida101 and Harris v. Florida,102 raise two different, yet 
interrelated, questions regarding canine police practices: 
first, whether the Supreme Court’s prior decision that a 
sniff is a nonsearch applies in all circumstances, including 
sniffs from the curtilage of a home;103 second, whether the 
canine’s positive indication of narcotics suffices to establish 
probable cause for a search if the dog is reliable, and what 
type of proof is required to establish such reliability.104 
  
 101. 73 So. 3d 34, 36 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (2012).  
 102. 71 So. 3d 756, 758 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012). 
 103. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 36-37. 
 104. Harris, 71 So. 3d at 758. In Harris, the Florida Supreme Court held that 
“[t]he State’s presentation of evidence that the dog is properly trained and 
certified is the beginning of the analysis.” Id. at 771. In addition to 
demonstrating proper training and certification, the court required that the 
state keep and present records of the dog’s performance in the field, including 
the dog’s successes (alerts where contraband that the dog was trained to detect 
was found) and failures (“unverified” alerts where no contraband that the dog 
was trained to detect was found). Id. at 771, 775. Finally, the court required 
that the state present evidence as to the experience and training of the officer 
handling the dog. Id. at 775. Under a “totality of the circumstances” analysis, 
the court then considered the evidence and evaluated the dog’s reliability. Id. at 
766-67. The brief Florida submitted sought certiorari from the Supreme Court to 
resolve the dog sniff issue and to provide a bright line rule on this matter. See 
Brief for Petitioner at 8-10 Florida v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012) (No. 11-
817). The state’s criticism of the Florida Supreme Court is based on the high 
evidentiary burden that it places on the state to show evidence of dog statistics, 
its argued misconception of the requirement for probable cause, the conflict with 
Supreme Court precedents on this matter, and the lack of independent and 
adequate state grounds. Id. at 9-10. The brief quotes from the Supreme Court to 
say that: “[t]he courts are not strangers to the use of trained dogs to detect the 
presence of controlled substances.” Id. at 20 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 505-06 (1983)). The state also notes that bloodhound evidence has been 
looked upon favorably for centuries. See id. at 16-18, 22 (discussing United 
States v. Ludwig¸10 F.3d 1523, 1528 (10th Cir. 1993)). The brief also argues that 
courts have agreed that a trained narcotics detection dog’s positive indication 
alone is enough to establish probable cause if the dog is reliable. Id. at 19-20; see 
also United States v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing United 
States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 749 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Kennedy, 
131 F.3d 1371, 1376-77 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 
153 (6th Cir. 1996); and United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632, 638 (9th 
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Underlying these two questions, however, is a third 
question that has not yet been addressed, at least not 
explicitly so, by the Supreme Court: is the police dog a 
  
Cir. 1993)). Arguing in support of Florida, the amicus curiae briefs state that 
the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Harris has caused a “deep split” of 
authority among the various courts. Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia et 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1 Florida v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 1796 
(2012) (No. 11-817). On the one hand, federal courts have granted much power 
to canine sniffs. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 505-06 (1983) (stating 
that a positive alert from a dog sniff would have resulted in the defendant’s 
justifiable arrest on probable cause); United States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209, 213 
(3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the canine’s alert when sniffing the exterior of the 
vehicle gave the officer probable cause to search the vehicle); United States v. 
Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d 726, 730 (5th Cir. 2003) (ruling that the dog’s alert in 
the bus provided reasonable suspicion that defendant possessed the drugs that 
the dog sensed). On the other hand, in Oregon v. Foster, 252 P.3d 292 (Or. 2011), 
the Oregon Supreme Court qualified that an alert by “a properly trained and 
reliable drug-detection dog can be [the] basis for probable cause to search,” and, 
if at issue, is to be reviewed by individualized inquiry based on the totality of 
the circumstances. Id. at 294; see also Oregon v. Helzer, 252 P.3d 288, 289 (Or. 
2011) (holding that state did not meet its burden in demonstrating that dog’s 
sniff was reliable). Some circuit courts have ruled, accordingly, that “[c]ourts 
have not definitively addressed the issue of the quality or quantity of evidence 
necessary to establish a drug detection dog’s training and reliability.” United 
States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1994); cf. South Dakota v. Nguyen, 
2007 SD 4, ¶ 16, 726 N.W.2d 871, 876 (noting three divergent views on the 
reliability of dog sniffs). Nonetheless, most jurisdictions have concluded that “[a] 
drug detection dog is considered reliable when it has been trained and certified 
to detect drugs.” See, e.g., United States v. Winters, 600 F.3d 963, 967 (8th Cir. 
2010). The Seventh Circuit held, for example, that statements that a “dog 
‘graduated from a training class in drug detection’ and ‘has proven reliable in 
detecting drugs and narcotics’” on prior occasions were sufficient to establish 
probable cause. United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22, 27 (7th Cir. 1980). The 
factors considered by trial courts include the dog’s training and certification, its 
successes and failures in the field, the experience and training of the officer 
handling the dog, and the canine’s training and track record, with emphasis on 
the amount of false negatives and false positives the dog has furnished. See 
United States v. Delaney, 52 F.3d 182, 188 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[T]here is no legal 
requirement that [an] affidavit specify the number of times the dog previously 
has sniffed out drugs . . . .”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Nguyen, 2007 
SD 4, at ¶¶ 17-19, 726 N.W.2d at 876-77; Tennessee v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762, 
768-69 (Tenn. 2000). The amicus curiae brief in Harris warns that “[t]he 
potential for varied and inconsistent applications raises serious questions 
regarding whether the ‘deterrent effect’ of canine detection outweighs the 
proportional ‘harm to the justice system.’” Brief for the Commonwealth of 
Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14 Florida v. Harris, 
132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012) (No. 11-817) (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 
135, 147-48 (2008)). 
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technology? Although this question may seem at best 
marginally connected to the two questions soon to be 
decided by the Supreme Court, the way that various courts 
have approached it in the past—either implicitly or 
explicitly—has been instrumental in forming their decisions 
and will likely also be instrumental in forming the Supreme 
Court’s holding in the two Florida cases.  
On the one hand, if the dog, who has aided man for 
centuries and who, “unlike humans, [does] not 
prevaricate,”105 is considered a natural extension of the 
human senses—namely, a biological and not a mechanical 
entity—the Court is more likely to decide that the dog sniff 
is not a search, and thus that it does not require Fourth 
Amendment protections. On the other hand, defining police 
dog sniffs as a technology will likely trigger more stringent 
Fourth Amendment protections, eliciting a different line of 
precedent (mainly Kyllo) and resulting in a more detailed, 
statistical, and even scientific inquiry into the particular 
device in question and, in this case, the specific canine, 
sniff, and handler.  
B. Human Senses—and Their Extension 
It has long been established that the police are not 
expected to “shield their eyes when passing by a home on 
public thoroughfares.”106 They are similarly not expected to 
  
 105. Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 10 Florida v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012) (No. 11-817). 
 106. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). In this case, the police 
received an anonymous tip that defendant was growing marijuana in his 
backyard. Id. at 209. Since it could not be observed easily from the ground 
because of a tall fence, the police secured a plane and flew over defendant’s 
house to observe the yard. Id. The flyover confirmed the presence of marijuana. 
Police then obtained a search warrant and seized the marijuana. Id. The 
defendant argued that the search by flyover was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. See id. at 211. The Supreme Court found that the naked-eye 
observation from the plane did not violate the Constitution. Id. at 215. The 
Court held: 
The observations by Officers Shutz and Rodriguez in this case took 
place within public navigable airspace . . . in a physically nonintrusive 
manner; from this point they were able to observe plants readily 
discernible to the naked eye as marijuana. That the observation from 
aircraft was directed at identifying the plants and the officers were 
trained to recognize marijuana is irrelevant. Such observation is 
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shield their hands from touching, or their noses from 
smelling, what the public can touch and smell.107 Indeed, 
“[s]ensory perception has traditionally been an inextricable 
part of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”108 For example, a 
policeman’s sense of smell—performed from a legal 
standpoint—can establish probable cause for a lawful 
search or seizure.109 A dog’s sense of smell operates very 
much like that of a human’s, except it is much stronger. In 
fact, “[i]f laid out, the surface area of a dog’s olfactory cells 
would cover a space equivalent to the skin area of the dog’s 
  
precisely what a judicial officer needs to provide a basis for a warrant. 
Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down 
could have seen everything that these officers observed. On this record, 
we readily conclude that respondent's expectation that his garden was 
protected from such observation is unreasonable and is not an 
expectation that society is prepared to honor.  
Id. at 213-14. The Court also held that “[t]he Fourth Amendment simply does 
not require the police traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a 
warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.” Id. at 215. 
 
 107. But see Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337, 339 (2000) 
(distinguishing that “Ciraolo [is] . . . different from this case because [it] 
involved only visual, as opposed to tactile, observation. Physically invasive 
inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection”). The Bond 
court considered two questions. First, whether the defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Id. at 337. The Court found that by using an opaque bag 
and placing the bag directly above his seat, the defendant indeed established an 
expectation of privacy. Id. at 336-38. Second, the Court considered whether the 
individual’s expectation of privacy was one that society would recognize as 
reasonable. Id. at 338. Here, the Court found that although the defendant had 
an expectation that his bag would be handled, he did not reasonably expect that 
his bag would be felt in an exploratory manner. Id. at 338-39. Thus, the physical 
manipulation of the defendant’s bag violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 339. 
See David S. Rudstein, “Touchy” “Feely”—Is There a Constitutional Difference? 
The Constitutionality of “Prepping” a Passenger’s Luggage for a Human or 
Canine Sniff After Bond v. United States, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 199-200 (2001).  
 108. Stone, supra note 62, at 1123.  
 109. See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1853-55, 1858 (2011) (holding that 
the smell of marijuana, coupled with the noise emanating from an apartment, 
established the grounds for a constitutional warrantless entry based on the 
exigency rationale of evidence destruction); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 
10, 13 (1948) (recognizing that the presence of odors from burning opium may 
justify issuance of a search warrant); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 
(1932) (“Prohibition officers may rely on a distinctive odor as a physical fact 
indicative of a possible crime.”).  
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body. In comparison, the surface area of human olfactory 
cells would cover no more than a postage stamp.”110  
In the past, the government’s intrusion into one’s 
privacy usually entailed some sort of physical trespass into 
a protected Fourth Amendment space.111 Today, however, 
  
 110. Shannon R. Hurley-Deal, Note, State v. Fisher: Canine Sniffs—Who Let 
The Dogs Out?, 26 N.C. CENT. L.J. 47, 51 (2003). Robert Bird also discusses the 
source of the strength of dogs’ sense of smell: 
The effect of the dog’s olfactory cells is not entirely clear. Some experts 
claim the result is an enhanced ability to detect minute levels of 
odorous material. Others assert that a canine’s strength lies in its 
ability to discriminate among odors. Scientists supporting the 
discrimination theory believe that each olfactory receptor responds to a 
different odor; the more receptors, the greater the power to distinguish 
between scents. The answer most likely lies somewhere between the 
two opposing theories. 
Bird, supra note 66, at 408-09. Additionally, on the topic of animal alternatives 
to dogs, Bird notes the following: 
Canines are not the only animal suitable for drug detection tasks. Some 
law enforcement agencies have begun to use Vietnamese Potbellied 
Pigs to detect narcotics. Sniffer pigs have been widely used by German 
Police and Customs, and are beginning to gain acceptance in America. . 
. . Further, their olfactory system is more sensitive than a dog’s, and 
pigs are far more intelligent than their canine counterparts. . . . If the 
trend continues, sniffer pigs may supplement or even replace dogs in 
the narcotics detection task.  
Id. at 411 n.41 (citations omitted). In “TED Talks, ” a scientist discusses how he 
has successfully implemented two programs in Africa with rats that have been 
trained to sniff out land mines and tuberculosis. Bart Weetjens: How I Taught 
Rats to Sniff Out Land Mines, TED (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.ted.com/talks/bart_weetjens_how_i_taught_rats_to_sniff_out_land_
mines.html. Similar to dogs, domesticated rats have also been selectively bred 
throughout the centuries for appearance, intelligence, and friendliness towards 
humans. Id. 
 111. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (“Neither the 
cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought to our 
attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a 
defendant, unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person or 
such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects or an actual physical 
invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.”). But see 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967) (“It is true that the absence 
of such penetration was at one time thought to foreclose further Fourth 
Amendment inquiry, for that Amendment was thought to limit only searches 
and seizures of tangible property. But ‘[t]he premise that property interests 
control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.’ 
Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that surveillance 
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technological advancements enhancing human sensory 
capabilities make it possible to acquire information without 
conducting such physical invasions. The first line of cases in 
which the courts dealt with the issue of surveillance 
technologies concerned low-level sense enhancing 
technologies, such as searchlights112 and binoculars.113 The 
courts have traditionally construed these simple 
technologies as straightforward extensions of the human 
senses and, therefore, as nonsearches that do not require a 
warrant so long as the officer was lawfully present in the 
place from which the evidence was seen, smelled, heard, or 
touched—also defined as the “plain view” doctrine.114 The 
idea was that because the police officer could perform the 
task without physically invading a private space, the 
investigation does not amount to a search.115 The question 
  
without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell outside 
the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on 
which that decision rested. Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth 
Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well 
to the recording of oral statements overheard without any ‘technical trespass 
under local property law.’”) (citations omitted). 
 112. See United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (finding “the use of a 
searchlight [] comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass”).  
 113. See United States v. Grimes, 426 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1970); United 
States v. Christensen, 524 F. Supp. 344, 346-48 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (“[Binoculars] 
merely magnify what would in any event be apparent to the naked eye.”). 
 114. See Illinois v. Caballes, 548 U.S. 405, 416 n.6 (2005) (Souter, J., 
dissenting); see also supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. 
 115. This rationale was adopted in the case of beepers and was also used to 
distinguish Global Positioning Devices (GPS) from beepers. See United States v. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-52 (2012) (distinguishing various Supreme Court 
rulings related to beepers and GPS tracking). In United States v. Knotts, 460 
U.S. 276, 281 (1983), the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not 
apply to the police use of beepers because a ‘‘person traveling in an automobile 
on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements.’’ But later, in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1984), 
the Court explained that although the installation of a beeper was permissible, 
monitoring it in a private residence violated the Fourth Amendment. More 
recently, courts have struggled with the application of beeper jurisprudence to 
GPS. For instance, the New York Court of Appeals stated: 
GPS is not a mere enhancement of human sensory capacity, it 
facilitates a new technological perception of the world in which the 
situation of any object may be followed and exhaustively recorded over, 
in most cases, a practically unlimited period. The potential for a similar 
capture of information or “seeing” by law enforcement would require, at 
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has become more complex, however, with the advent of 
powerful new surveillance technologies.116 
In its first consideration of such new surveillance 
technologies, the Supreme Court in Kyllo held that when 
police obtain by sense-enhancing technology any 
information regarding the interior of the home that could 
not otherwise have been obtained without physical 
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, this 
constitutes a search, at least where the technology in 
question is not in general public use.117 
The question in the dog sniff cases is, then, whether a 
sniff is a simple extension of the officer’s senses (similar to 
eyeglasses), or whether it is an “advancing technology” 
(similar to infrared sensors).118 When the dog is perceived as 
  
a minimum, millions of additional police officers and cameras on every 
street lamp.  
People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009). 
 116. See DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE 
SOCIETY 53 (Univ. of Minneapolis Press 1994) (The “ten characteristics of the 
new surveillance that set it apart from traditional forms of social control” are 
that “[i]t transcends distance, darkness and physical barriers. It transcends 
time, and this can be seen especially in the storage and retrieval capacity of 
computers; personal information can be ‘freeze-dried.’. . . It is of low visibility or 
invisible; data subjects are decreasingly aware of it. . . . It is frequently 
involuntary. . . . Prevention is a major concern; think of bar-coded library books 
or shopping mall video cameras, which are there to prevent loss, not to teach the 
immorality, of theft. It is capital- rather than labour-intensive, which makes it 
more and more economically attractive. It involves decentralized self-policing. . . 
. It triggers a shift from identifying specific suspects to categorical suspicion. It 
is both more intensive and more extensive. In Stanley Cohen’s metaphor, the 
net is finer, more pliable, and wider.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 117. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); see also Froh, supra note 
59, at 342-43 (highlighting the four factors used by the Court to determine 
whether police conduct amounts to a search: whether the “technique [is] sense-
enhancing,” whether “the intrusion [is] into an area traditionally associated 
with personal privacy,” whether “the kind of device or technique in question is 
generally available to the public,” and whether “the information obtained [is] of 
a kind that could only have been acquired with physical trespassory invasion 
into the area if not for the assistance of the device”) (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 
34).  
 118. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (“We have previously reserved judgment as to how 
much technological enhancement of ordinary perception from such a vantage 
point, if any, is too much.”). For the definition of advancing technologies, see 
supra note 10. 
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an “old” rather than an “advancing” technology, the courts 
tend to hold that the sniff is merely part of routine 
investigation by the police and thus a nonsearch.119 Indeed, 
the courts have often taken different and, at times, 
contradictory approaches when considering the status of 
dogs as technologies. Moreover, some courts have avoided 
this debate about whether dog sniffs are a traditional or 
advancing technology by ruling that a dog is a dog, not 
technology.120 The following two cases illustrate this complex 
and contradictory identity of the police dog. 
C. Is the Dog a Technology—and Where? 
1. United States v. Thomas. In United States v. 
Thomas,121 a magistrate issued a warrant based on an 
affidavit submitted by a Drug Enforcement Administration 
agent that argued for the existence of probable cause in part 
based on a K-9 sniff outside of the defendant’s apartment.122 
The defendant claimed that the canine sniff constituted an 
illegal search, that without the illegal sniff there was no 
probable cause to obtain a warrant in the first place, and 
that, as a result, the evidence seized at his apartment 
should have been suppressed.123 The Second Circuit court 
agreed, holding that:  
It is one thing to say that a sniff in an airport is not a search, but 
quite another to say that a sniff can never be a search. The 
question always to be asked is whether the use of a trained dog 
intrudes on a legitimate expectation of privacy. While one 
generally has an expectation of privacy in the contents of personal 
  
 119. See infra Part II.C; cf. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39 n.6. The Court discusses 
Ciraolo and responds to the dissent’s argument that protections dissipate when 
technology enters general public use. Id. The majority declines to address the 
problem of general public use technology, stating only that “we can quite 
confidently say that thermal imaging is not routine.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 120. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Maryland, 864 A.2d 1006, 1015-16 (2004); see also 
supra notes 11, 78-80 and  accompanying text. 
 121. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 122. Id. at 1366. 
 123. Id. 
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luggage, this expectation is much diminished when the luggage is 
in the custody of an air carrier at a public airport.
124
  
The court’s reasoning is instructive; it contended that 
defining an investigation as a use of technology is not the 
end of the exploration; one must also examine what was 
investigated and where.125 Consequently, a practice that is 
not intrusive in an airport may be intrusive when employed 
at a person’s home.126 The court also looked into the degree 
of sense enhancement when determining whether an 
advanced technology was used. In the language of the court:  
With a trained dog police may obtain information about what is 
inside a dwelling that they could not derive from the use of their 
own senses. Consequently, the officers’ use of a dog is not a mere 
improvement of their sense of smell, as ordinary eyeglasses improve 
vision, but is a significant enhancement accomplished by a 
different, and far superior, sensory instrument.
127
  
The fact that an ordinary policeman could not have 
picked up such scents from outside the door of a private 
residency thus led the court to conclude that the canine sniff 
invaded the defendant’s expectation of privacy;  because of 
the defendant’s heightened expectation of privacy inside his 
dwelling, the court concluded that the canine sniff 
constituted a search.128 Since the agent had procured no 
warrant, the search violated the Fourth Amendment.129 
  
 124. Id. at 1366 (citations omitted). 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. Id. at 1367 (emphasis added).  
 128. See id.; Hope Walker Hall, Comment, Sniffing Out the Fourth 
Amendment: United States v. Place—Dog Sniffs—Ten Years Later, 46 ME. L. 
REV. 151, 173-75 (1994); Barbara Tarlow, Note, Dog Sniff Searches and United 
States v. Thomas: The Second Circuit Takes a Needed Bite Out of Place, 19 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1097, 1102 (1986). In United States v. Waltzer, one judge praised 
the dog’s reliability in detecting narcotics, calling the dog, “the able, canny 
canine Kane, with the perfect record—all hits and no misses.” 682 F.2d 370, 374 
(2d Cir. 1982) (Oakes, J., concurring). However, Kane later broke that perfect 
record by erroneously alerting officers to narcotics in an apartment. See United 
States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 756 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 129. See id. The New York Court of Appeals used a similar rationale in 
considering a dog sniff an “investigative technique,” which constituted a search. 
See New York v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1055, 1058 (N.Y. 1990). However, it 
nevertheless found that there was reasonable suspicion of the presence of illegal 
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2.  Fitzgerald v. Maryland. The case of Fitzgerald v. 
Maryland130 presents a strong contrast to Thomas on several 
levels, especially regarding whether a dog should be defined 
as a technology. In Fitzgerald, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals held that “[a]s the canine sniff doctrine does not 
depend upon the sniff’s location, we shall hold that a sniff of 
an apartment door from a common area is a permissible 
nonsearch under the Fourth Amendment.”131 The facts of 
Fitzgerald are as follows: in February 2002, an anonymous 
source informed the police that Fitzgerald and his girlfriend 
sold marijuana.132 A subsequent investigation confirmed 
that the couple lived in the building mentioned by the 
informant.133 Furthermore: 
[Officer] Brian then visited [Fitzgerald’s] apartment building 
accompanied by Alex, [a] certified drug detection dog. Brian and 
Alex entered the building through unlocked glass doors leading to 
a vestibule with a stairwell and mailboxes. Brian led Alex to scan 
apartment doors A, B, C, and D. Alex only “alerted” at apartment 
A, indicating the presence of narcotics. . . . Alex repeated the sniffs 
with identical outcomes. [Based on an affidavit that relied on the 
result of Alex’s sniffs,] the next day the District Court judge 
issued a search and seizure warrant for [Fitzgerald’s] apartment . 
. . .
134
  
  
drugs in the residence to establish the constitutionality of the search. See id. at 
1059. The court defined the canine sniff as a “supersensitive detection device,” 
explaining that it exposed evidence that traveled beyond the perimeters of a 
private space yet were not detectable to the police off-hand. Id. at 1058. 
 130. Fitzgerald v. Maryland, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004). 
 131. Id. at 1007.  
 132. Id. at 1008. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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Soon after, the warrant was executed.135 The police seized 
“substantial amounts of marijuana and other evidence of 
marijuana use and distribution.”136 Fitzgerald was arrested 
and charged with possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute.137 
The court distinguished between a dog sniff outside an 
apartment and the use of a thermal imaging device, defined 
as a search in Kyllo: 
[I]t is clear that Kyllo has no bearing on dog sniffs. First, a dog is 
not technology—he or she is a dog. A dog is known commonly as 
‘man’s best friend.’ Across America, people consider dogs as 
members of their family. The same cannot be said of cars, 
blenders, or thermal imagers.
138
  
In a footnote, the court cited American Bar Association 
standards that “proposed to prohibit the use of a 
‘contraband-specific detection device’ on residences or 
individuals.”139 A comment to section 2-9.2 of the standards 
states that “a device which could mimic the behavior of 
some specially trained dogs by alerting only to the presence 
of drugs would be ‘contraband-specific.’”140 Based on this 
text, the court reached the conclusion that “even pre-Kyllo, 
the ABA recognized the difference between a drug detecting 
dog and a ‘device’ or technology.”141 Further, the court noted 
that although Justice Stevens’s dissent in Kyllo, joined by 
Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Kennedy, criticized the term 
“sense-enhancing technology” as overly broad, these 
Justices also argued that this term should nonetheless 
“embrace potential mechanical substitutes for dogs trained 
to react when they sniff narcotics,”142 thereby implicitly 
  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 1015. 
 139. Id. at 1015 n.8 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 2-9.2 at 57 (3d ed. 1999)). 
 140. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ELEC. SURVEILLANCE § 2-9.2 cmt. 
b (3d ed. 1999).  
 141. See Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1015 n.8. 
 142. Id. at 1015 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 47 (2001) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (emphasis added)). 
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excluding dog sniffs. In another footnote, the court 
addresses Fitzgerald’s argument that since an “inanimate 
device performing the same function as Alex” is considered 
a technology, so should Alex. In the words of the court:  
We do not need to determine here whether employing a device 
performing identical functions and with identical limitations to 
live dogs would constitute a search. Faced with a device similar in 
narrow scope to a dog, the Jacobsen Court held that its use did not 
constitute a search. Faced with a thermal imager with a broader 
scope, the Kyllo Court held that its use was a search. Either way, 
Fitzgerald ignores that Kyllo’s holding and rationale centered on 
“advancing technology.” A dog-mimicking device would be 
technology that could advance to become far more invasive than a 
dog’s sniff.
143
 
The court reasoned that unlike the dog, a technology 
that imitates its powers would have the potential to develop 
into something more invasive than any dog could ever be. In 
other words, even when they perform the same function, the 
two detection strategies—dog and machine—are 
fundamentally different in light of the latter’s “creeping 
potential.”144 The court held, accordingly, that dogs are not 
an advanced technology. “Even taking into account 
potential gains from evolution, breeding, and improved 
nutrition, the limits to dogs’ future ability to smell are not 
far from the current limits,” the court explained,145 quoting 
from the lower court’s decision146 that stated: 
We know that a canine “non-alert” may be as probative as an 
“alert,” as, in Silver Blaze, Sherlock Holmes explained the 
significance of “the dog that did not bark in the night.” In The 
Odyssey, Homer recounts how Ulysses’s incognito return to 
Ithaca, after an absence of twenty years, was almost compromised 
  
 143. Id. at 1015 n.9.  
 144. See supra notes 11, 26, 41. In Kyllo, Justice Scalia raised concern over the 
creeping of advancing technologies, stating that a mechanical application of the 
Fourth Amendment would “leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing 
technology—including imaging technology that could discern all human activity 
in the home.” 533 U.S. at 35-36; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 
962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that advancements in technology can 
change people’s reasonable expectations and new technology may also provide 
“increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy”). 
 145. Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1016. 
 146. See id. 
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when his faithful dog, Argos, alerted to the smell of his long 
missing master. The point is that, solidly based in both fact and 
fiction, the canine sense of smell is not a new or unfamiliar 
“technology.”
147
  
The Maryland Court of Appeals held: “Not so with 
technology. Technology is constantly advancing; few who 
have witnessed the computer revolution doubt that 
technology can advance in the future beyond our wildest 
dreams today.”148  
The court explained, further, that other Supreme Court 
precedent imply that the Kyllo decision is inapplicable to 
dog sniffs.149 The court explained that Kyllo was decided 
with almost no mention of Place, which would not be the 
case if it applied.150 “Were the Kyllo standard to apply to dog 
sniffs, surely the Court would have discussed its well-
established Place precedent.”151 The court also noted: 
“Finally, Kyllo’s concern with the scope of thermal imagers 
and potential revelation of intimate private details fits 
neatly with Place’s rationale that dog sniffs are unique in 
their narrow ‘yes/no’ [scope].”152 The court held, accordingly, 
that “[a] person does not have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in contraband, but does in bath water. A dog that 
  
 147. Id. at 1037-38. 
 148. Id. at 1016. 
 149. See id. 
 150. The Maryland court bolstered its argument by noting that less than seven 
months before Kyllo, both the majority opinion and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
dissent in Edmond neatly and without much discussion stated the application of 
Place to searches of automobiles and luggage. See id. at 1016. (discussing City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (citing United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983))); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 52-53 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (citing Place, 492 U.S. at 706-07). 
 151. Fitzgerald, 837 A.2d at 1016. The court stated along these lines: “it is 
clear that Kyllo has no bearing on dog sniffs.” Id. at 1015. This argument was 
also advanced by Timothy Stone in his critique of Florida’s decision in State v. 
Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), which applied the logic of Kyllo 
to determine that the dog sniff of the defendant’s home was a warrantless 
search. See Stone, supra note 62, at 1134-35.  
 152. Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1016. 
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can determine contraband’s existence and nothing else is 
not a search, even when sniffing the exterior of a home.”153 
D. The “Sui Generis” Nature of Dogs 
The Maryland Court of Appeals is not alone in 
emphasizing what it perceived to be important distinctions 
between dogs and machines. Carolyn Snurkowski, Florida 
Associate Deputy Attorney General, stated in her petition 
for certiorari: 
The Florida Supreme Court also overlooked the nature of the dog. 
A dog is a dog, not the rapidly “advancing technology” that 
concerned the Kyllo Court. . . . Chocolate Labrador Retrievers are 
not “sophisticated systems.” Rather, they are common household 
pets that possess a naturally strong sense of smell. Nor are dogs a 
recent development. Rather, they have been part of human 
communities for several millennia and were used at the time of 
the adoption of the Fourth Amendment in 1791. The Kyllo Court 
characterized the thermal imagining device at issue as “a device 
that is not in general public use.” Dogs, in stark contrast, are not 
  
 153. Id. Similarly, in United States v. Brock, the Seventh Circuit stated that 
the Second Circuit’s holding in Thomas “has been rightly criticized” as 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s precedent holding that a defendant’s 
expectation of privacy must be one “that society is prepared to consider 
reasonable.”  417 F.3d 692, 697 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 
466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). In Brock, police were legally present inside an 
apartment when a canine sniff alerted to the presence of narcotics behind a 
locked bedroom door. Id. at 693-94. The police then obtained a search warrant 
for the residence, listing the canine sniff as one of the elements leading to 
probable cause. Id. The court held “that the dog sniff inside Brock’s residence 
was not a Fourth Amendment search because it detected only the presence of 
contraband and did not provide any information about lawful activity over 
which Brock had a legitimate expectation of privacy.” Id. at 696. Along these 
lines, in a case involving a dog sniff of a vehicle’s exterior without any suspicion, 
the Eight Circuit held that “when a police officer makes a traffic stop and has at 
his immediate disposal the canine resources to employ this uniquely limited 
investigative procedure, it does not violate the Fourth Amendment to require 
that the offending motorist’s detention be momentarily extended for a canine 
sniff of the vehicle’s exterior.” United States v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 1016-
17 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
$404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 649 (8th Cir.1999)); see also United 
States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 788 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[S]ubjecting the 
exterior of such a motor vehicle to the olfactory genius of a drug detection dog 
does not infringe upon the vehicle owner’s fourth amendment rights.”). 
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a device and are quite common. Nor was there a “vigorous search 
effort” at the front door; all Franky really did was breath[e].
154
 
Dogs, according to the Florida petition, are biological 
entities, not technologies; they are also not sophisticated, 
nor are they “new.” Based on this logic, dogs cannot be 
defined as advancing technologies. All they really do is 
breathe, something that only living organisms—not 
machines—can do.  
The argument about the distinct nature of dogs and 
their sniffs was also implied in the founding Supreme Court 
decision concerning dog sniffs, United States v. Place: 
[T]he canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no other 
investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in 
which the information is obtained and in the content of the 
information revealed by the procedure. Therefore, we conclude 
that the particular course of investigation that the agents 
intended to pursue here—exposure of respondent’s luggage, which 
was located in a public place, to a trained canine—did not 
constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.
155
 
The Court’s sui generis label, I argue here, is applied to 
the drug detection dog not only because of the limited 
nature of its sniff, as the Court’s rationale overtly states, 
but also because of the nature of the dog itself, as implied by 
the Court. The Court, in other words, took a more lenient 
approach toward a sniff performed by a biological organism 
rather than by a mechanical device.  
The Place logic was, however, lost on the Justices in 
Jacobsen, as demonstrated by the catastrophic predictions 
sketched out in this case by dissenting Justices Marshall 
and Brennan: 
[U]nder the Court’s analysis in these cases, law enforcement 
officers could release a trained cocaine-sensitive dog— . . . a 
“canine cocaine connoisseur”—to roam the streets at random, 
alerting the officers to people carrying cocaine. Or, if a device were 
developed that, when aimed at a person, would detect 
instantaneously whether the person is carrying cocaine, there 
would be no Fourth Amendment bar, under the Court’s approach, 
  
 154. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23, Florida v. Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995 
(2012) (No. 11-564).  
 155. Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (1983). 
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to the police setting up such a device on a street corner and 
scanning all passersby. In fact, the Court’s analysis is so 
unbounded that if a device were developed that could detect, from 
the outside of a building, the presence of cocaine inside, there 
would be no constitutional obstacle to the police cruising through 
a residential neighborhood and using the device to identify all 
homes in which the drug is present. In short, under the 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment first suggested in Place 
and first applied in this case, these surveillance techniques would 
not constitute searches and therefore could be freely pursued 
whenever and wherever law enforcement officers desire. Hence, at 
some point in the future, if the Court stands by the theory it has 
adopted today, search warrants, probable cause, and even 
“reasonable suspicion” may very well become notions of the 
past.
156
 
Whereas all but one of these predictions involved the 
use of machines, the first prediction—of dogs sniffing 
persons on streets (and perhaps in their homes, too)—is 
quite feasible. In fact, this prediction has already been 
fulfilled, at least on the streets of New York City.157 The 
reason for this reality, I claim here, is precisely that dogs 
have been treated by the courts as sui generis and thus as 
subject to less judicial scrutiny.158 Under my hypothesis, 
what has been underlying the courts’ sui generis approach is 
the perceived unconstructed, “first nature” of dogs,159 which 
exists in stark contrast to manmade, nonorganic machines. 
By this logic, the Supreme Court has mistakenly 
distinguished dogs from technology, whereas it should have 
granted similar protections from both.  
  
 156. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 157. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 158. See, e.g., United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
majority of our sister circuits . . . have held that canine sniffs used only to detect 
the presence of contraband are not Fourth Amendment searches.”). 
 159. “First nature” is defined as a primary, pristine, and abundant external 
nature that remains untouched by human activity; in contrast, “second nature” 
can be defined as forms of nature that have been transformed by human 
activity. See NEIL SMITH, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: NATURE, CAPITAL, AND THE 
PRODUCTION OF SPACE 19 (1984); see also Noel Castree, Socializing Theory: 
Theory, Practice and Politics, in SOCIAL NATURE: THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLITICS 
6-7 (Noel Castree & Bruce Braun eds., 2001); DAVID PEPPER, ECO-SOCIALISM: 
FROM DEEP ECOLOGY TO SOCIAL JUSTICE 108 (1993).  
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E.  Guys, Binoculars, and “Smell-O-Matic” Machines 
On October 31, 2012, the Supreme Court heard oral 
arguments in the case of Florida v. Jardines.160 Although it 
would be premature to predict how the Justices will decide 
in this case, their questions and remarks during the 
arguments—alongside those argued by the attorneys—
reveal the contested identity of the police dog. Specifically, 
at least some of the Justices seem to subscribe to the 
modernist dichotomy between nature and technology, which 
I believe will subsequently inform their practical decision 
about whether or not to define Franky’s sniff as a search.  
Although at first glance the oral arguments seem to be 
tackling numerous questions and going in myriad 
directions, they can arguably be distilled into three distinct 
approaches that revolve around the police dog’s status. On 
one end of the spectrum is the approach that the dog is not 
a technology; that for sniffing purposes, it is no different 
than a “guy.”161 On the other end of the spectrum is the 
approach that a dog is an advancing technology—a “smell-o-
matic” machine, similar to the infrared device used in 
Kyllo.162 Somewhere between these two extremes is the 
approach that configures the dog as a low-level technology, 
akin to binoculars or telescopes.163 All three approaches rely, 
to some degree or another, on the assumption challenged by 
this Article: that nature and technology are clearly distinct 
and independent categories. I will now proceed to explore 
these three approaches in some detail. 
The first approach was argued repeatedly in the oral 
arguments by the petitioner and seemingly supported by 
some of the Justices:  
MR. GARRE: . . . Franky’s nose is not technology. It’s—he’s using—
he’s availing himself of God-given senses in the way that dogs 
have helped mankind for centuries. 
JUSTICE KAGAN: So does that mean that if we invented some kind 
of little machine called a, you know, smell-o-matic and the 
police officer had this smell-o-matic machine, and it alerted to 
  
 160. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jardines, supra note 67, at 1. 
 161. Id. at 17, 19. 
 162. Id. at 16-17 
 163. Id. at 6. 
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the exact same things that a dog alerts to . . ., the police officer 
could not come to the front door and use that machine? 
MR. GARRE: . . . . It would be different in that you don’t have 
technology in this case. And I think that’s an important 
distinction because, as we read Kyllo, the Court was very 
concerned about advances in technology, and that’s just not true 
for a dog’s nose. 
JUSTICE KAGAN: So your basic distinction is the difference between 
like a machine and Franky. 
. . . . 
That we should not understand Franky as kind of a sense-
enhancing law enforcement technology, but we should think of 
him as just like a guy. 
MR. GARRE: Your Honor, I think that’s true for two reasons. One is 
Franky is using the same sense of smell that dogs have used for 
centuries. So this isn’t a case where if you allow a dog to sniff 
today, he might use x-ray vision in the future. 
 And the other thing is that Franky—that the use of dogs for 
their sense of smell, which everyone agrees is extraordinary, 
mankind has been using them for centuries.
164
 
Under the first approach, then, the use of dogs by the 
police is no different from their use by a friendly neighbor.165 
And just as the police should not be expected to shield their 
eyes from what is in plain view, they should also not be 
expected to shield their nose from sniffing what is in plain 
smell.166 The dog is portrayed here as a natural extension of 
the human police officer—as a “guy,” in Justices Kagan’s 
and Sotomayor’s succinct phrase.167 The petitioner 
highlights this interchangeability between dog and officer 
when arguing that, “there is no invasion in their . . . 
expectation of privacy when either a man or a dog, when 
lawfully present on the property, uses their God-given 
  
 164. Id. at 16-18. 
 165. Id. at 41. 
 166. Id. at 45; see Susan F. Mandiberg, Marijuana Prohibition and the 
Shrinking of the Fourth Amendment, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 23, 39-43 (2012) 
(noting cases about plain smell). 
 167. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jardines, supra note 67, at 17, 19. 
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senses to detect [drugs].”168 This argument assumes that the 
dog’s nose as a God-given sense—as natural and ahistorical, 
as opposed to artificial or manmade—cannot logically 
coexist with the dog’s definition as a technology. Justice 
Alito seemed to be in agreement with this construction of 
the dog when he questioned the respondent: 
I thought the relevance of technology was that the technology that 
we have now . . . much of it was not available at the time when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted, so we can’t tell what . . . people 
in 1791 would have thought about it.  
But that’s not true of dogs. Dogs were around. They have been 
around for 10,000 years . . . and they’ve been used to detect scents 
for 10,000—for thousands of years. Certainly, they were available 
for that purpose in 1791, weren’t they?
169
  
On the opposite end of the spectrum is the approach 
articulated by the respondent. According to this approach, 
K-9s are advancing technologies and, as such, their sniffs of 
protected spaces should be defined as searches that require 
probable cause, even when performed from the sidewalk. 
This approach is evident from the following excerpt from the 
oral arguments:  
JUSTICE KAGAN: . . .[Y]ou do concede if the police officer walks up 
to the door, smells it himself, no problem there; is that right? 
. . . .  
  
 168. Id. at 20 (emphasis added). In Florida v. Harris, Florida argued similarly, 
albeit in a different context, that: “Dogs, like humans, become old and impaired 
over time.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Florida v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 1796 
(2012) (No. 11-817) [hereinafter “Transcript of Oral Argument, Harris”]. 
 169. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jardines, supra note 67, at 47. The Court 
elicited that there is an apparent paucity of cases on point: 
JUSTICE ALITO: If a dog on a leash is brought up to the front door of a 
person’s house, was that a trespass at the time when the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted? 
MR. BLUMBERG: If it was without the consent of the homeowner, yes, it 
was a trespass. 
JUSTICE ALITO: What is the case that says that? 
MR. BLUMBERG: I do not have a case. 
Id. at 38.  
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So the difference is the dog. So what difference does the dog 
make?  
. . . .  
And, you know, to make it even more, the dog is not a scary-
looking dog, the dog is a Cockapoo.  
So just like, you know, your neighbor with his Cockapoo walks up 
to your door all the time, that’s what this police officer has done. 
Why do you win that? 
MR. BLUMBERG: Well, whether it’s a Cockapoo or Franky, who, 
from all the pictures, appears to be a very cute dog, it’s not what 
the dog looks like, it’s what the dog is doing on the front porch, 
which is— 
JUSTICE KAGAN: The dog does what your neighbor’s dog does. 
MR. BLUMBERG: Well, no, this dog—the neighbor’s dog does not 
search for evidence on your front porch. That’s the key 
distinction.
170
  
Justice Ginsburg summarized the second approach later in 
the arguments when she reflected back at the respondent: “I 
thought you were talking about a dog trained to detect 
contraband . . . not just any old dog.”171  
Finally, the third, middle ground, approach—
articulated most explicitly by Justice Scalia—seems to be 
the least contingent on the status of the dog, and the most 
contingent upon the particular location of the sniff. This 
approach treats the sniff as analogous to simple sense- 
enhancing devices such as binoculars. Accordingly, if the 
dog sniff is used from a legitimate standpoint—a public 
  
 170. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jardines, supra note 67, at 40-41. The oral 
arguments mentioned the use of dogs as advanced technology:  
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: . . . . If the police go by with their dog 
intending to sniff, and the dog alerts, on the sidewalk but two feet 
away is the front door, that’s okay, right? 
. . . . 
MR. BLUMBERG: No, it’s not okay, respectfully, because the dog would 
still be revealing details inside the home that the officer could not 
reveal using his or her ordinary senses. 
Id. at 45; see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35-36 (2001). 
 171. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jardines, supra note 67, at 55. 
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street, for example—the sniff does not invade reasonable 
expectations of privacy. However, when performed at the 
curtilage of the home, the dog sniff transforms into a search. 
In Justice Scalia’s words: 
And there’s such a thing as what is called the curtilage of a house. 
As I understand the law, the police are entitled to use binoculars 
to look into the house if—if the residents leave the blinds open, 
right?  
. . . . 
But if they can’t see clearly enough from a distance, they’re not 
entitled to go onto the curtilage of the house, inside the gate, and 
use the binoculars from that vantage point, are they?  
. . . .  
[So] why isn’t it the same thing with the dog? This dog was 
brought right up—right up to the—to the door of the house.
172
 
In another hypothetical, Justice Scalia replaced the 
binoculars with a different low-level technology: the 
telescope. He suggested: 
Suppose you—you have someone who, who has been guilty of a 
crime. He has—he has the body. He has committed a murder and 
he has the body in the home. He certainly wants to keep that 
private, right? And he foolishly and mistakenly leaves the blinds 
open in the room where—where the corpse is lying, and the 
policeman at a great distance has a telescope and he looks 
through the blinds and he sees the corpse. Can the police go into 
the home?
173
 
Finally, Justice Scalia clarified: “It isn’t just the sniffing in 
the abstract. It’s the sniffing at this point, the sniffing at a 
person’s front door.”174 Justice Scalia explained that he 
  
 172. Id. at 6. 
 173. Id. at 33. 
 174. Id. at 15. Justice Breyer approaches the problem similarly:  
I’ve been trying to figure out just what you say, but in a slightly 
different form. Do people come up to the door with dogs? Yes. Do the 
dogs breathe? Yes.  
Do in fact policemen, like other people, come up and breathe? Yes. Do 
we expect it? Yes, we expect people to come up and breathe. But do we 
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treats the police dog’s sniff no differently than he would 
treat any other sniff—even by a human police officer—when 
performed on the curtilage of a home for the purpose of con-
ducting a search.175  
Although Scalia’s approach ostensibly moves away from 
the status of the dog to the status of place and property, it is 
nonetheless contingent on the assumption that the dog is 
akin to binoculars, not to infrared machines. All of this is 
for a reason: in Kyllo, Scalia wrote the majority opinion that 
found the use of advancing technology as constituting a 
search, even when conducted from “open fields.”176 Here, 
however, Scalia clearly posited that a K-9 sniff may be per-
formed from the sidewalk, similar to the use of binoculars. 
It is the dog sniff’s status as a simple sense-enhancing tech-
nology—somewhere between a “guy” and a “smell-o-matic” 
machine—that then translates, in Scalia’s statements, into 
a legal geography of sniffs.177 
F. Reliability 
As a result of the growing concerns with the accuracy of 
dog alerts, when ruling on the constitutionality of sniffs, 
lower courts (but not the Supreme Court178) are increasingly 
  
expect them to do what happened here? And at that point, I get into the 
question: What happened here?  
Id. at 56-57. 
 175. Id. at 44. 
 176. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001). “Open fields” fall 
outside of Fourth Amendment protection because they cannot be construed as 
persons, houses, papers, or effects within the constitutional meaning. See Hester 
v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (holding that “the special protection 
accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, 
papers, and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields,” and establishing the 
doctrine used today for searches and seizures). Later, the Court reapplied the 
“open fields” doctrine to reiterate its continued authority in a case involving “no 
trespassing” signs. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) 
(“[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the 
Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or 
surveillance.”). 
 177. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jardines, supra note 67, at 6-7. 
 178. Robert Bird emphasizes that the Supreme Court has never questioned an 
accuracy record of a particular canine, nor has it addressed the specific 
qualifications for a particular canine; he suggests, as a result, that “lower courts 
have attempted to fill the gap and determine when a canine alert may be 
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considering the circumstances of dog sniffs in establishing  
their reliability. Although these decisions are usually not 
framed through the bifurcated conception of dogs and 
machines revealed in this Article, they nonetheless point to 
the growing recognition that detection dogs are similar to 
advancing technologies, especially in demonstrating their 
reliability.  
Specifically, in Oregon v. Foster179 and Oregon v. 
Helzer,180 Oregon’s Supreme Court recently held that only 
an alert by “a properly trained and reliable drug-detection 
dog [could] be a basis for probable cause to search.”181 The 
court explained that this inquiry should be based on the 
totality of the circumstances, including the dog’s training, 
certification, and performance—on the one hand, and the 
handler’s training, certification, and performance when 
teaming with the dog—on the other hand.182  
  
accepted as reliable.” See Bird, supra note 66, at 417. But see United States v. 
Dillon, 810 F. Supp. 57, 61 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[T]he canine sniffing technique ‘is 
now sufficiently well-established to make a formal recitation of a police dog’s 
curriculum vitae unnecessary in the context of ordinary warrant applications . . 
. .’”) (quoting United States v. Watson, 551 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (D.D.C. 1982)). 
 179. 252 P.3d 292 (Or. 2011). In Foster, the defendant was pulled over for a 
traffic violation. Id. at 294. The officer called for a canine unit based on his 
previous observation of the defendant and the belief that he had just conducted 
criminal activity. Id. The detection dog sniffed the exterior of the vehicle and 
alerted at the driver’s side door. Id. The defendant refused to consent to a search 
of the vehicle, but the officers proceeded and found methamphetamine residue 
on a pipe inside a fanny pack on the seat of the car. Id. 
 180. 252 P.3d 288 (Or. 2011).  
 181. See Foster, 252 P.3d at 294. In Helzer, the Oregon Supreme Court applied 
the totality of the circumstances test set forth in Foster, and concluded that the 
government failed to provide evidence of what factors went into the 
handler/canine training and failed to provide details of the canines’ previous 
training. 252 P.3d at 289. Consequently, the court held that the government did 
not meet its burden and that the evidence should therefore be suppressed. Id. at 
291-92. 
 182. Foster, 252 P.3d at 298. Furthermore, Foster argued that dogs trained to 
detect odors were unreliable since they may lead to an alert based on residual 
odors versus actual drugs. Id. at 298. He also contended that the “play-reward” 
method used to train detection dogs is unreliable because it is not widely 
accepted among the scientific community. Id. at 302. The court rejected both 
arguments on the premise that “[p]robable cause does not require the use of the 
most reliable source of information, rather than a sufficiently reliable source; 
neither do standards for the admissibility of evidence at trial apply to the 
assessment of probable cause.” Id. The “play-reward” method is used by police to 
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The Supreme Court is currently considering Florida v. 
Harris, which focuses on the question of canine reliability.183 
This case concerns an exterior canine sniff of a vehicle.184 
Although the Florida court could have easily decided the 
case in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Place and 
Caballes, it held instead that sufficient probable cause only 
exists when there is a reasonable basis for believing that 
the specific canine is reliable based on the totality of the 
circumstances.185 Furthermore, the court found “that 
evidence that the dog had been trained and certified to 
detect narcotics, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish 
the dog’s reliability for purposes of determining probable 
cause.”186 The burden of establishing the dog’s reliability 
rests upon the prosecution, which must present evidence 
relating to: “the dog’s training and certification records, an 
explanation of the meaning of the particular training and 
certification,”187 field performance and records of the 
canine’s alerts, the field officer’s training and handling of 
the dog, and “any other evidence known to the officer about 
the dog’s reliability.”188  
In the oral arguments in Florida v. Harris, Florida 
argued that the Supreme Court should prescribe a narrow 
test for determining a K-9’s reliability:  
  
train detection dogs throughout the United States. See id. at 295. It involves 
pairing and training canine-handler teams in the following manner: the handler 
takes a play toy, such as a tennis ball, and submerges it in a drug (heroin, 
cocaine, meth, or marijuana); the dog is familiarized with the odor by playing 
with the tennis ball; the trainer then hides the tennis ball and the dog must find 
it through sniffing its odor; after this, the handler hides a drug rather than the 
submerged ball and the dog sniffs out the drug; as a reward, the dog is 
permitted to play with his or her favorite toy. Id. 
183. 132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012) (No. 11-817). The oral arguments in Harris followed 
immediately after those in Jardines, on October 31, 2012. As I argue in this 
Part, in many ways these two cases are quite interrelated. 
 184. See Harris v. Florida, 71 So. 3d 756, 760, 762 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 
132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012). 
 185. In the language of the court: “Because a dog cannot be cross-examined 
like a police officer,” it is the state’s burden to show “that the officer had a 
reasonable basis for believing the dog to be reliable” before conducting the 
search. Id. at 758, 759. 
 186. Id. at 759. 
 187. Id. at 775. 
 188. Id. 
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MR. GARRE: Well, Your Honor, in our view, we don’t think it’s – it’s 
an appropriate role for the Court to delve into the contours of 
the training, what specific methods were used to train or 
distract or—you know, all the contours that [the respondents] 
bring up in their brief. 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what does a judge do, just say, the police 
department says this is adequate, so I have to accept it’s 
adequate. 
MR. GARRE: [Y]ou would have to accept it, Your Honor, on its 
face.
189
 
This approach seems to have won strong support from 
some of the Justices. Here, for example, is an excerpt from 
the exchange between Justice Scalia and the respondent: 
JUSTICE SCALIA: What—what—what are the—what are the 
incentives here? Why would a police department want to use an 
incompetent dog? Is that any more likely than that a medical 
school would want to certify an incompetent doctor? What—
what incentive is there for a police department? 
MR. GIFFORD: The incentive is to acquire probable cause to search 
when it wouldn’t otherwise—otherwise be available. . . . 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Willy-nilly. . . . So let’s get dogs that, you know, 
smell drugs when there are no drugs. You really think that 
that’s what’s going on here? 
  
 189. Transcript of Oral Argument, Harris, supra note 168, at 8. Palmore, 
supporting the petitioner, explains: 
I think it’s critical, as Mr. Garre pointed out, that the courts not 
constitutionalize dog training methodologies or hold mini trials with 
expert witnesses on what makes for a successful dog training program. 
Because, as Mr. Garre said, the Government has critical interests, life 
and death interests, that it stakes on the reliability of these dogs.  
So the U.S. Marshals use dogs to protect Federal judges. The Federal 
Protective Services use dogs to keep bombs out of Federal buildings. 
The TSA uses dogs to keep bombs off of airplanes. FEMA uses dogs to 
find survivors after hurricanes.  
There are 32 K-9 teams in the field right now in New York and New 
Jersey looking for survivors of Hurricane Sandy.  
So, in situation after situation, the government has in a sense put its 
money where its mouth is, and it believes at an institutional level that 
these dogs are quite reliable. 
Id. at 26. 
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MR. GIFFORD: Officers like to search so that they can get probable 
cause so that they can advance their career. Forfeiture is also 
an issue. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: They like to search where they’re likely to find 
something, and that only exists when the dog is well trained. It 
seems to me they have every incentive to train the dog well.
190
 
The first half of this Article provided an extensive 
review of the Supreme Court’s still implicit and the lower 
courts’ explicit assumptions about the nature-culture 
schism and its centrality in the context of drug detection 
dogs. In the remainder of this Article, I will draw on the 
sociology of science literature to offer an alternative 
conceptual framework for evaluating the K-9 in the context 
of Fourth Amendment searches and seizures.  
III. BIOTECHNOLOGY 
A. Technology and Biology 
Courts’ distinction between dogs and technologies is 
grounded in common assumptions that juxtapose nature 
and humanly constructed artifacts—or nature and 
culture.191 Such assumptions, I claim in this Article, are 
incorrect, unsustainable, and can have devastating effects 
when applied in the legal arena—namely the removal of 
constitutional protections from an invasive investigation 
merely because the dog is deemed “nature” rather than 
“machine.” Two interrelated assumptions underlie the 
nature/technology binary construed by the courts. First is 
the assumption that only humanly constructed things can 
be classified as technology; because humans do not 
manufacture dogs, the latter cannot be defined as a 
technology. The second assumption is that the distinction 
between dogs and machines rests on the deeper and more 
fundamental distinction between organic and dead matter. 
  
 190. Id. at 34-35. 
 191. Many scholars have written critically about the nature-culture divide. 
See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR, POLITICS OF NATURE: HOW TO BRING THE SCIENCES INTO 
DEMOCRACY 49 (2004); KATE SOPER, WHAT IS NATURE: CULTURE, POLITICS AND 
THE NON-HUMAN 8-9 (1995); RAYMOND WILLIAMS, THE COUNTRY AND THE CITY 79 
(1975). For a summary of such critiques, see IRUS BRAVERMAN, ZOOLAND: THE 
INSTITUTION OF CAPTIVITY 29-50 (2012). 
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The following Parts address both assumptions and present 
my argument that K-9 sniffs should be understood by courts 
as an advancing technology and scrutinized as such. In a 
significant departure from the dominant “either/or” 
approach articulated earlier, I will draw on science and 
technology studies (STS) scholarship to demonstrate that 
human relationships with seemingly natural animals are 
actually much more complex and reflective of human agency 
than one might think from reading judicial opinions. In line 
with this approach is my argument that police dogs are 
“biotechnologies.”  
The remainder of this Article can be distilled into two 
arguments. First is my argument that today’s drug-sniffing 
dogs are very much “manufactured”: dogs are selectively 
bred for war and law enforcement, they are used for medical 
research, and, finally, they increasingly operate alongside 
nonorganic technologies (video cameras, for example) to 
perform highly specialized functions. Given this 
specialization, the law enforcement dog sniff is unlikely to 
be in “general public use.” Second is my argument that 
despite the dog’s actual function as a technology, it is also 
very much alive and organic. These properties of the dog 
may serve to explain why courts have treated it (or her/him) 
very much as a living, almost human, entity—and as the 
opposite of “dead” technology. Accordingly, I will show how 
police treat K-9s as family members, how special rights are 
given to police dogs akin to rights for human officers, and 
how these dogs are deemed mystically infallible in their 
detection skills. The term “biotechnology” holds together 
these two coexisting dimensions of the police dog.  
B. Biotechnology in STS Scholarship 
Biotechnology is commonly defined as an industry of 
applied biology that involves the use of living organisms and 
bioprocesses in engineering, medicine, and other fields.192 
Here, however, I would like to adopt the somewhat different 
and more specific STS definition of biotechnology as 
“biological artifacts shaped by humans to serve human 
  
 205. Biotechnology Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, 
http://www.oed.com./view/Entry/19255 (last visited Nov. 15, 2012). 
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ends”193 and as a “coproduction of natures and cultures and 
the interpenetration of bodies and technologies.”194 The term 
“coproduction” is key here.195 This term’s use by STS 
scholars indicates a move from technological determinism 
and social constructivism to a more systemic understanding 
of how technology and society coproduce each other—
namely, how two or more variables in a system affect, and 
essentially create, each other.196 Another key component in 
the above definition of biotechnology is the interplay 
between natures and cultures, what Donna Haraway refers 
to as “naturecultures.”197  
Edmund Russell explores the ways in which humans 
have shaped evolution through changing both themselves 
and other species.198 In his book The Garden in the Machine: 
Toward an Evolutionary History of Technology, Russell 
inverts Leo Marx’s argument in his book, The Machine in 
the Garden, which exemplifies how technology has been 
perceived as an intrusion, especially in nineteenth century 
American literature.199 Russell frames the history of modern 
  
 193. Edmund Russell, Introduction: The Garden in the Machine: Toward an 
Evolutionary History of Technology, in INDUSTRIALIZING ORGANISMS: 
INTRODUCING EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY 1 (Susan R. Schrepfer & Philip Scranton 
eds., 2004).  
 194. DONNA HARAWAY, WHEN SPECIES MEET 56 (2008) [hereinafter HARAWAY 
2008].  
 195. See id. 
 196. Jasanoff, supra note 14, at 2-3; see also Harbers, supra note 14, at 11.  
 197. According to Donna Haraway, “naturecultures” refers to the failure of the 
boundaries between nature and culture and the way culture is always already 
implicated in any conception of nature, rendering the nature/culture binary 
irrelevant and incorrect. See HARAWAY 2008, supra note 194, at 6, 11. 
“Naturecultures” does not necessarily mean that “nature” does not exist, but 
that it has never existed apart from culture. See id. By referring to this term in 
the plural, Haraway indicates that “naturecultures” are the spaces where these 
boundaries are transgressed, while at the same time calling attention to the 
demand for specificity. See id. Hence, “natureculture” is not a monolithic 
structure, but rather one instance of a plurality of “naturecultures.” See id.;  id. 
at 56; DONNA J. HARAWAY, SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN 8 (1991).  
 198. See Russell, supra note 193, at 1. 
 199. See id.; LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
PASTORAL IDEAL IN AMERICA 343 (35th Anniversary ed., 2000). Marx’s analysis 
focuses on the contrasting images of industry and nature in nineteenth century 
American literature. Id. at 3-4. He argues that cultural concerns over the 
decline of wilderness have led to the proliferation of the idea of what he calls 
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understandings of technology as growing from the 
assumptions that technology is entirely separate from 
nature:  
[T]echnology replaced or modified nature, but nature was not 
technology. But since machines are always made from metal, 
wood, rubber, and other products of nature, the assumption boils 
down to—put bluntly—nature having to be dead to be 
technology.
200
  
This view of the separation of nature and technology is 
incorrect, he argues, because “cattle, sheep, and horses did 
not simply witness the intrusion of technology into nature. . 
. . [T]hey were biological artifacts shaped by humans to 
serve human ends. They were technology and, in the root 
meaning of the word, biotechnology.”201 
Haraway applies Russell’s understanding of 
biotechnology to dogs, suggesting that “dogs deliberately 
selected and enhanced for their working capacities, for 
example, as herders, are biotechnologies in a system of 
market farming that became contemporary capital-intensive 
agribusiness through a welter of nonlinear processes and 
assemblages.”202 Although Haraway admits that Russell’s 
analysis attributes near-absolute agency to humans, she 
nonetheless finds this framework “rich for thinking about 
valuing dogs as biotechnologies, workers, and agents of 
technoscientific knowledge production in the regime of 
lively capital.”203 Haraway then applies this framework to 
experimental dogs, dogs as patients, and dogs trained by 
prisoners in rehabilitation projects.204 
Still in the realm of dogs, another STS scholar describes 
“how dogs with inherited bleeding disorders were brought 
into laboratory settings in the United States . . . [and] the 
value of understanding what historians of biology and 
  
“the machine in the garden,” or technology as intrusion into a pristine yet 
vanishing nature (the “pastoral ideal”). Id.; see id. at 265. This intrusion by the 
machine not only threatened to disturb American wilderness itself, but also 
disrupted important cultural views of life and pastoral ideals. Id. at 6-7. 
 200. Russell, supra note 193, at 1. 
 201. Id. 
 202. HARAWAY 2008, supra note 194, at 56. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 56-57. 
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biomedical science mean when they claim that laboratory 
organisms are products of scientific and social practice.”205 
Through these laboratory experiments, “a new kind of 
organism came into being.”206 The experiments performed on 
these dogs had direct effects on developments in medical 
research, suggesting that laboratory dogs were a cultivated 
technology, organisms that “are both born and made” and, 
as such, demanded a moral response of care from human 
scientists.207 
Dogs are not the only animals that exist in the uneasy 
space between living creatures and mechanized technology; 
it is equally important to note how other working animals 
entered the popular perception of biotechnologies. Ann 
Greene applies the notion of biotechnology to war horses as 
she tracks the history of the Union’s procurement and use of 
horses during the American Civil War.208 Greene argues 
that the current distinction between technology and horses 
is entirely contrary to nineteenth century conceptions of the 
horse’s place within industrialization.209 The American Civil 
War, Greene argues, was as much “the first industrialized 
war” as it was “a war of extensive animal power.”210 The 
transportation of soldiers and supplies over land required 
significant animal work.211 Aside from wagon horses used for 
transportation, artillery horses to pull field guns, and 
horses used for cavalry mounts, horses were also crucial to 
the functioning of armies in the Civil War.212 In fact, “the 
Union army alone employed between 650,000 and 1,000,000 
horses.”213 Horses were not only “components of war 
technology,” they were also seen as such by their Civil War 
  
 205. Stephen Pemberton, Canine Technologies, Model Patients: The Historical 
Production of Hemophiliac Dogs in American Biomedicine, in INDUSTRIALIZING 
ORGANISMS, supra note 193, at 191, 191-92. 
 206. Id. at 194. 
 207. Id. at 203-05. 
 208. See Ann N. Greene, War Horses: Equine Technology in the American Civil 
War, in INDUSTRIALIZING ORGANISMS, supra note 193, at 143, 143-65. 
 209. See id. at 159-61. 
 210. Id. at 143 (quotation marks omitted). 
 211. See id. at 146. 
 212. Id. at 147. 
 213. Id. at 143. 
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contemporaries, who “frequently employed mechanical 
metaphors to describe and understand horses as prime 
movers.”214 “Army horses were the central component in a 
network of relationships,” Greene writes.215 For a very long 
time, horses have been considered “military instruments” 
and “[i]n the Civil War, as in the present, horses proved to 
be integral components of the most modern technological 
systems.”216  
Another historical study about work animals shows that 
people living in cities viewed horses along the same lines as 
mechanical trolleys.217 Beginning with the development of 
the concept of “horsepower” in 1775, horses were 
increasingly viewed as property and their work was 
mechanized as such.218 With the invention of the steam 
engine, consumers could “know how many horses an engine 
would replace in order to judge its economic value.”219 
Developments in thermodynamics and the invention of the 
dynamometer also increased the prevalence of animal-
machine comparisons.220 The nineteenth century saw 
important changes in the styles of transportation—public, 
private, and freight—within cities, from one-horse carts to 
teams, and the horse-drawn omnibus and horse car.221 The 
omnibus was pulled by four horses and operated on “fixed 
schedules and predetermined routes.”222 Finally, “[w]hen 
owners perceived horses as obsolescent and unable to 
compete first with electric street cars and then with the new 
motor trucks and motor cars, they disappeared with 
astonishing rapidity except for some specialized niche 
  
 214. Id. at 159-60. 
 215. Id. at 160. 
 216. Id. at 161; see also Barbara Orland, Turbo-Cows: Producing a Competitive 
Animal in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, in INDUSTRIALIZING 
ORGANISMS, supra note 193, at 167, 167  (examining the development of high-
yield dairy cows in nineteenth century Europe as a fruitful context for studying 
human-animal coproduction in a nonwar context). 
 217. Joel A. Tarr & Clay McShane, The Horse as an Urban Technology, 15 J. 
URB. TECH., 1, 5, 14-15 (2008). 
 218. Id. at 7. 
 219. Id. at 8. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 10, 14-15. 
 222. Id. at 10. 
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areas.”223 The study points to this disappearance as the final 
proof of the interchangeability between horses and 
machines in the urban environment.224 
In what follows, I will demonstrate that similar to war 
and urban horses and hemophilic dogs, the history of police 
detection dogs is rife with rich applications of the 
biotechnology framework. The following Parts will explore 
how detection dogs and humans have altered each other in 
the course of their shared history and, more recently, in 
canine breeding and human-dog training for law 
enforcement duties. I propose that a legal test that 
disregards the imbricated nature of dog-human 
naturecultures is not only flawed conceptually and 
experientially, but is also bound to crash into the cyborg 
realities of contemporary and future surveillance schemes. 
IV. WAR AND DETECTION DOGS: A CO-EVOLUTION 
This Part provides a brief historical and cultural 
account of the use of dogs for human ends, thereby 
demonstrating a few interrelated points: 1) that work dogs 
are historical and cultural entities infused with human 
meaning; 2) that although work dogs have been around for 
many centuries, the use of dogs as detection or surveillance 
devices has only surged in the past several decades; 3) that 
the military dog is the forefather of contemporary police 
dogs; 4) that the multiple detection functions of dogs have 
resulted in their genotypic and phenotypic differentiation 
into numerous subspecies; and 5) that professional 
studbooks and pedigrees are increasingly used to make 
breeding decisions that produce the “best” surveillance dog. 
Through their recruitment as soldiers in human wars and 
as family members in our homes, dogs have multiplied in 
unprecedented numbers.225  
A. Dogs in the Service of Human Wars 
The United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) 
National Detector Dog Manual describes the history of dog 
  
 223. Id. at 15. 
 224. Id. at 14-15. 
 225. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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work in human service in great detail.226 According to the 
manual, this history goes back thousands of years and is 
centrally bound up in warfare.227 Similar to horses, dogs 
were used in a multitude of roles ranging from guards to 
messengers, and were also used as mascots and draft 
animals: 
[War dogs serviced] the Egyptians, Greeks, Assyrians, Persians, 
and the Roman Empire. Roman legions deployed entire 
formations of armored attack dogs against enemy armies. Attila 
the Hun used mastiff-type dogs and Talbot hounds . . . as warriors 
in his campaigns and as sentries when his troops were 
encamped.
228
  
Although humans have used dogs in the service of war 
for centuries, it was only in the last several decades that the 
potential usefulness of dogs’ scenting ability was recognized 
in the service of war and law enforcement.229 The USDA 
National Detector Dog Manual suggests that “[p]erhaps the 
most famous early scenting dog was Barry, a Saint 
Bernard,” who lived in Switzerland in the early nineteenth 
century, but that dogs had been used for their ability to find 
people by smell in the United States Army for at least half a 
century before that.230 The manual explains that “Benjamin 
Franklin recommended the use of dogs by the U.S. Army as 
a means of searching for marauders who were killing 
colonists and burning settlements near Boston. . . . In 1835, 
the U.S. Army imported bloodhounds from Cuba . . . to use 
as mantrackers.”231  
These efforts, however, do not necessarily qualify as 
organized. The first organized effort took place in Nazi 
Germany, where the army “used tracker dogs to silently 
follow [the] tracks of the British Special Air Services (SAS) 
officers who parachuted into Germany to collect intelligence 
  
 226. U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATIONAL DETECTOR DOG MANUAL, app. C at C-1-1  
(2004), available at 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/import_export/plants/manuals/ports/downloads/ 
detector_dog.pdf [hereinafter USDA Manual].  
 227. See id.  
 228. Id. 
 229. See id at C-1-1 to C-1-2.  
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at C-1-2. 
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prior to WWII.”232 These dogs were both trackers and attack 
dogs and were so effective that the British Army quickly 
adopted this method, developing the “Recce Patrols” that 
used “human scouts and tracker dogs to locate the Japanese 
who were hiding on islands in the Pacific theatre.”233 
B. Dogs in the Service of the War on Drugs 
In the United Kingdom, law enforcement began training 
dogs to detect illegal substances as early as the 1950s.234 But 
it was not until 1968 that the United States Department of 
Defense launched an official Military Working Dog Program 
in San Antonio, Texas, at Lackland Air Force Base.235 
Concurrently, the United States Customs Service initiated 
“an experimental narcotic detector dog training program,” 
after carefully studying the capabilities of dogs to detect 
illegal substances.236 This program focused on “training dogs 
to detect and respond to marijuana and hashish,” but 
quickly “expanded the targeted drugs to include cocaine and 
heroin.”237 Also of note is the fact “the Customs dogs gave 
the first example of versatility of dogs in learning to 
discriminate several target odors.”238 Prior to the training of 
these dogs, it was thought unlikely that a dog could learn to 
distinguish between four distinct odors.239 Around the same 
time, in response to the growing troubles in Northern 
Ireland, the British Royal Army Veterinary Corps began 
training its dogs in explosives detection work.240 In 1973, the 
United States added explosives detection to their dog 
training programs.241  
By this point, most governments had incorporated 
detector dogs into their armies and law enforcement 
  
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. USDA Manual, supra note 226, at C-1-2. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See id. at C-1-3. 
 237. See id.  
 238. Id. 
 239. Id.  
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
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agencies.242 The current use of these dogs in law 
enforcement and elsewhere covers a range of diverse 
functions and interests that reflect the dog’s flexibility. As 
stated in the USDA National Detector Dog Manual: 
[T]hey assist local, state and federal agencies in locating evidence, 
intercepting contraband and smuggled items, help police officers 
find criminals, lost children and the bodies of victims, are 
members of search-and-rescue teams, seek out land mines, search 
for live victims of earthquakes and other disasters, find evidence 
in arson investigations, detect explosive devices, poached abalone, 
and can even detect malignant skin growths.
243
 
Some criminal procedure scholars believe that “[d]uring 
the past twenty years, the United States has been fighting 
one of the most difficult wars in its history: the war on 
drugs. The narcotics detection dog has been a stalwart ally 
in that conflict, detecting illegal narcotics on countless 
occasions.”244 In the context of the war on drugs:  
[S]tate and federal officials use drug detection dogs during 
[routine] investigations. For example, in Texas, the Department of 
Public Safety deploys more than twenty dog-handler teams, 
[which] routinely perform more than 1000 sniff tests annually. 
Arizona’s Department of Public Safety likewise deploys more than 
25 canine teams. And in 2010, the Virginia State Police 
Department’s 18 narcotic teams led to 118 arrests and 127 drug 
seizures.
245
 
The emergence of detection dogs in American policing is 
reflected in the elevated legal status of these dogs within 
the police force. “In many jurisdictions, the intentional 
injuring or killing of a police dog is defined as a felony, 
subjecting the perpetrator to harsher penalties than animal 
cruelty laws.”246 Additionally, “[s]ome law-enforcement 
  
 242. See, e.g., id. (discussing Mexico’s use of dogs in agricultural detection). 
 243. Id. at C-1-6. 
 244. See Bird, supra note 66, at 405.  
 245. Brief for Texas et al. as Amici Curiae supporting Petitioner, supra note 
25, at 2-3 (citations omitted). 
 246. Police Dog, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police_dog (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2012). For a comprehensive list of state statutes from 
California, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Texas 
(pending legislation), and Utah, see Statutes Protecting Police Dogs, EDEN 
CONSULTING GROUP, http://www.policek9.com/html/statutes.html (last visited 
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organizations outfit dogs with ballistic vests and some make 
the dogs sworn officers, [supplying] them with . . . police 
badges and IDs.”247 In certain cases, “the police chief 
administers the human oath of office to the dog, and the 
handler affirms on the dog’s behalf.”248 In other cases, “the 
dog is trained to bark in affirmation of the oath.”249 Finally, 
“[w]hen the ceremony is complete, the dog is presented with 
a badge to wear on its collar.”250 Furthermore, anyone who 
kills a federal law enforcement animal faces fines and up to 
ten years in prison.251 Similar laws protect K-9s from 
malicious injury in every state except South Dakota,252 and 
various statutes apply to “every canine cop.”253 Finally, “a 
police dog killed in the line of duty [may be] given a full 
police funeral.”254 
This historical review of the use of detection dogs for 
human ends makes abundantly clear that “[h]uman life 
ways changed significantly in association with dogs. 
Flexibility and opportunism are the name of the game for 
both species, who shape each other throughout the still 
  
May 31, 2012); see also Animal Cruelty Laws State by State, STRAY PET 
ADVOCACY (2003), 
http://www.straypetadvocacy.org/PDF/AnimalCrueltyLaws.pdf. 
 247. Police Dog, supra note 246; see, e.g., VEST ‘N P.D.P., 
http://vestnpdp.com/index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (explaining that it is 
a non-profit organization dedicated to providing bulletproof and stabproof vests 
to police dogs). Such organizations recognize that “[t]hese courageous animals 
risk their lives every day helping to keep our communities safe,” and invite the 
public to learn how to participate in “providing the protection K-9 law 
enforcement officers need and deserve.” Id.    
 248. See Brian Palmer, So Help You, Dog: How Does a Canine Cop Become a 
“Sworn Officer?”, SLATE (Jul. 18, 2008, 1:53 PM), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/07/so_help_you_dog.ht
ml. One version of an oath is: “I am forever your friend. I will serve and protect 
you with all my might, and be loyal to the very end.” Officer card, Valparaiso 
Police Dept., Ind. (on file with author). 
 249. Palmer, supra note 248. 
 250. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 252. See id. at 257; Animal Cruelty Laws, supra note 246.  
 253. Palmer, supra note 248. 
 254. Police Dog, supra note 246; see, e.g., Tonia Moxley, Police Dog Given an 
Officer’s Funeral, ROANOKE TIMES (Dec. 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.roanoke.com/news/nrv/wb/187837. 
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ongoing story of co-evolution.”255 More concisely even, this 
review demonstrates how, “Man took the (free) wolf and 
made the (servant) dog and made civilization possible.”256 
V. MANUFACTURING A SUPER DOG 
Dogs are closer to humans than any other animal in 
that they “share common interior sentiment [that is] 
evident in the differences they each manifest within their 
own species.”257 Indeed, “no animal other than dogs, with the 
possible exception of apes, comes as close to people in 
affective terms, nor does any make a stronger claim to be 
treated as human. . . . [Dogs] occupy a singular space 
between human culture and the rest of the animal world.”258 
Domesticated dogs are nominally the same species as their 
wilder cousins, wolves.259 However, the relationship between 
humans and their dogs is far different than that between 
humans and wolves. As this Part will show, unlike wolves, 
dogs are often seen as integral components of the human 
household or as fellow workers.  
Importantly, this Part will also demonstrate that 
although the public’s (and courts’) comfort and familiarity 
with dogs have clouded the perception of the animals as 
advancing technology, in fact, “genetics-based breeding 
programs with the intended goal of enhancing drug-
detection dog capabilities are in place.”260 For example, 
continued breeding of dogs with jackals to create “super 
sniffer dogs” shows substantial technological advancement 
in the realm of dog production for the use of detection.261 
Cloning, scientific breeding, and innovative training tactics 
  
 255. HARAWAY 2008, supra note 194, at 29.  
 256. Id. at 28. 
 257. Martin Wallen, Foxhounds, Curs, and the Dawn of Breeding: The 
Discourse of Modern Human-Canine Relations, 79 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 125, 133 
(2011). 
 258. Aaron Skabelund, Breeding Racism: The Imperial Battlefields of the 
“German” Shepherd Dog, 16 SOC’Y & ANIMALS 354, 357 (2008). 
 259. Bringing Wolves Home, NOVA (Nov. 11, 1997), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/nature/wolves-yellowstone.html. 
 260. Lunney, supra note 37, at 829. 
 261. Id. at 895 n.312. 
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demonstrate that dogs are not a static area of technology.262 
The material history of dog breeding highlights a focus on 
improvement and advancement that belies the popular 
perception of dogs as simply “Man’s best friend.” The 
following two subparts frame these arguments through the 
history of dog breeding and its relevance to police dogs in 
the United States. 
A. The History of Scientific Breeding 
Although dogs have been working with humans in 
various capacities for much of human history, it was not 
until the introduction of studbooks for the English foxhound 
and then the greyhound in the early nineteenth century 
that dogs were intentionally bred following a scientific 
method.263 Most other breeds had to wait until the 
publication of the Kennel Club Stud Book in 1874 for their 
pedigrees to be fully instituted.264 Consequently, most dog 
breeds did not exist as they appear now until after the 
Napoleonic wars.265 Canine typologies were developed 
decades prior to that, however, as part of the larger 
movement towards a discourse of “improvement” that was 
typical of the Agricultural Revolution.266 “As the privileged 
traits were isolated and distilled . . . they incurred demands 
that their purity be preserved,” scholar Martin Wallen 
writes.267 This perceived purity was based on a set of 
established criteria that determined coloring, shape, size, 
and ideal behavior.268 Dogs that followed these criteria “were 
imagined as possessing purity of blood. The ability to mold 
the bodies of animals through strict control over 
  
 262. See id. at 897. 
 263. See Wallen, supra note 257, at 127. It is not entirely clear what Wallen 
means by this. Competing accounts suggest that the English foxhound was 
originally bred in the 16th century, as a hunting dog for the court of Henry VIII. 
See, e.g., English Foxhound, K9WIRE.COM, http://www.k9wire.com/Dog-
Breeds/english-foxhound.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
 264. HARRIET RITVO, THE ANIMAL ESTATE: THE ENGLISH AND OTHER CREATURES 
IN THE VICTORIAN AGE 96 (1987).  
 265. Wallen, supra note 257, at 128. 
 266. Id. at 129. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 132. 
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reproduction, the elimination of certain offspring, and the 
recording of bloodlines in pedigrees bolstered these 
illusions.”269 The dog’s traits were recorded in breed 
taxonomies, which provided the knowledge that any 
individual dog will most likely “act within a limited range of 
possibilities,” determined by information provided by the 
dog’s pedigree history.270  
More so than for any other individual species, selective 
breeding of the domestic dog has resulted in astounding 
morphological diversity.271 Such selective breeding initially 
followed function, but the institution of dog shows and their 
ensuing popularity made the aesthetic perspective 
paramount.272 Along with the focus on aesthetics came 
myriad problems for both dogs and their breeders. For 
instance, there are now over 350 known diseases and 
conditions that plague pedigree dogs.273 
B. Breeding Police Dogs 
Writing about the German Shepherd dog and its breed 
history, one scholar depicted how the breed moved from a 
“valuable assistant of humans as a herder of sheep and 
other livestock” to “an agent of social control.”274 The same 
scholar also argued: 
[T]he Shepherd Dog probably has been the most widely 
represented [dog breed] in national and colonial armies. . . . [T]he 
breed so dominated canine law enforcement ranks in the United 
States that it came to be referred to as simply the “Police Dog” . . . 
[and] they are also often imagined as the stereotypical guard 
dog.
275
 
Indeed, the German Shepherd is the most commonly 
used breed in law enforcement and in militaries around the 
  
 269. Skabelund, supra note 258, at 355. 
 270. Wallen, supra note 257, at 132. 
 271. Cf. JULIET CLUTTON-BROCK, A NATURAL HISTORY OF DOMESTICATED 
MAMMALS 49 (1999).  
 272. See E. Anne McBride et al., The Pedigree Dog—Aesthetics Versus Ethics 
and Law, 5 J. VETERINARY BEHAV. 51, 51 (2010).    
 273. Id.  
 274. See Skabelund, supra note 258, at 357-58. 
 275. Id. at 358. 
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world, with the Belgian Malinois as a close second.276 A 
short time after the German Shepherd breed was recognized 
by the American Kennel Club in the 1920s, it also became 
one of the most popular dogs in Britain, where it was 
renamed “Alsatian” due to the anti-German anxiety 
following WWI.277 This breed, which was initially developed 
in 1899, spread quickly both in terms of popularity and 
use.278 In the United States, several types of dogs, other 
than the German shepherd, have been used for drug 
detection, including Golden Retrievers, Belgian Malinois, 
Labrador Retrievers, and English Springer Spaniels.279 
Some agencies prefer Labrador Retrievers because of their 
amiability.280  
Early on, detection dogs were obtained from animal 
shelters,281 but this was found problematic due to the very 
low success rates associated with training such dogs.282 In 
fact, “approximately 1 shelter dog of 1000 passes the basic 
tests that serve to admit a dog to a formal training program; 
of those that pass, only a small fraction (perhaps 1 in 40-50) 
eventually pass a full training program and become certified 
search dogs.”283  
  
 276. See Lunney, supra note 37, at 835 (citing TRACY L. ENGLISH, OFFICE OF 
HISTORY, LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE, THE QUIET AMERICANS: A HISTORY OF 
MILITARY WORKING DOGS 23 (2000)); Simmons, supra note 99, at 428 n.105. 
 277. See Skabelund, supra note 257, at 355. 
 278. Id. at 354-55. 
 279. See Simmons, supra note 99, at 428 n.105. 
 280. See Lunney, supra note 37, at 835 n.22; see also Gardiner Harris, To 
Serve and Protect, and Sniff Out Trouble, an International Dog of Mystery, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 5, 2011, at A16 (noting the popularity of Labrador Retrievers among 
United States soldiers serving overseas).  
 281. See Bird, supra note 66, at 411. 
 282. For a similar account in the South African context involving controlled 
study groups of puppies, see J.M. Slabbert & J.S.J. Odendaal, Early Prediction 
of Adult Police Dog Efficiency—A Longitudinal Study, 64 APPLIED ANIMAL 
BEHAV. SCI. 269, 269 (1999) (“Up to 70% of dogs that were bred at the South 
African Police Service Dog Breeding Centre . . . were not suitable for use.”).  
 283. NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, GUIDE FOR THE SELECTION OF DRUG 
DETECTORS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT APPLICATIONS 21 (2000), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183260.pdf; see DAVID G. MYERS, PSYCHOLOGY 
249 (2d ed. 1989) (“Animals can most easily learn and retain behaviors that 
draw on their biological predispositions . . . .”). 
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Although dog breeding for police forces is constantly on 
the rise, most American police dogs are still imported from 
Europe.284 Dogs imported from Hungary, Slovakia, and the 
Czech Republic are descendants of the border patrol dogs 
bred during the Cold War, and other dogs are purchased by 
United States agencies through brokers in Holland and 
Germany.285 Breeding information that traces selected dogs’ 
ancestry at least six generations back is readily available,286 
and specific training sites list the breeds used by police, 
including German Shepherds, Belgian Malinois, 
bloodhounds, Dutch Shepherds, and mixed breeds.287 
According to one American training center, breeders look for 
dog breeds that walk on slick floors, socialize around people, 
and possess good nerves, civility, strong bites, and a strong 
hold; they also look for dogs with good pack instincts and 
that are capable of working in small, dark areas.288  
  
 284. History of the Belgian Malinois, NORTH AMERICA K-9 SERVICES, LLC, 
http://www.police-dog.net/pages/belgianmalinois.php (last visited Oct. 8, 2012); 
see also Deborah Palman, Obtaining and Selecting Dogs for  
Police Work, U.S. POLICE CANINE ASS’N, 
http://www.uspcak9.com/training/canineselection.html (last visited Oct. 8, 
2012).  
 285. NORTH AMERICA K-9 SERVICES, LLC, supra note 284; see also JAMES R. 
ENGEL, THE POLICE DOG: HISTORY, BREEDS AND SERVICE, available at 
http://www.angelplace.net/Book/Ch8.pdf. 
 286. A pedigree database documents breeders and kennels from around the 
world. See Search Breeders, PEDIGREE DATABASE, 
http://www.pedigreedatabase.com/german_shepherd_dog/breeders.html (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2012). 
 287. See USK9 UNLIMITED, http://usk9.com/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2012); 
Breeding, USK9 UNLIMITED, http://www.usk9.com/breeding.php (last visited Oct. 
8, 2012); see also ULTIMATE WORKING DOGS, 
http://www.ultimateworkingdogs.com/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
 288. Patrol Dogs, USK9 UNLIMITED, http://www.usk9.com/patroldogs.php (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2012). The following excerpt provides interesting guidelines to 
police officers about how to choose their work dogs:  
In choosing a puppy, the handler should first watch the pups as a pack 
and observe each one. The ideal choice is an aggressive, self-confident 
pup who shows leadership over the others, and who will readily 
approach you as a stranger without hesitation or fear. Ideally the 
search is for the Alpha male of the litter, or the next closest prospect 
depending on temperament. Those who have an opportunity to see the 
pups suckling the mother will note that the leaders of the litter almost 
always will be the ones using the teats nearest the mother’s front legs. 
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Specific dog clubs set even higher standards for their 
dogs. For example, the German Shepherd Dog Club of 
America requires that their dogs be “strong, agile, well 
muscled animal[s], alert and full of life,” and details specific 
standards that apply to the dogs’ every aspect, including 
their general appearance, temperament, size, substance, 
head, topline, fore- and hind-quarters, and gait.289 This, for 
example, is how the website describes a good gait:  
The gait is outreaching, elastic, seemingly without effort, smooth 
and rhythmic, covering the maximum amount of ground with the 
minimum number of steps. At a walk it covers a great deal of 
ground, with long stride of both hind legs and forelegs. At a trot 
the dog covers still more ground with even longer stride, and 
moves powerfully but easily, with coordination and balance so 
that the gait appears to be the steady motion of a well-lubricated 
machine.
290
 
German Shepherd breeders are often required to show a 
signed pedigree, current health record, registration papers, 
sales contract, and a feeding schedule including amount and 
type, if available.291 Similarly, the American Belgian 
Malinois Club provides detailed breeding instructions that 
  
These teats yield more milk and therefore the dominant pups force the 
others to less lucrative positions.  
Beware of pups that whine, howl or bark constantly when excited as 
these habits may be hard to break and can be extremely annoying. 
These pups are very often anxious and although in other tests may rate 
high, they may have a tendency to be high strung and are often hard to 
settle down. . . .   
. . . . 
Older pups, in the six- to eight-month age range can also be given the 
gun test. Put the pup on a leash and have a suspect with a revolver 
containing blank loads suddenly appear and fire a few rounds into the 
air. The pup may balk a bit, but as long as he doesn’t break and try to 
run or show a lot of fear or anxiety, he should prove satisfactory.  
R.S. EDEN, DOG TRAINING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 24-25 (1985). 
 289. German Shepherd Dog Breed Standard, THE GERMAN SHEPHERD DOG 
CLUB OF AMERICA, http://gsdca.org/german-shepherd-dogs/education (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2012). 
 290. Id. (note the analogy to the machine toward the end of the quote).  
 291. Will a Breeder Ask Me Questions?, THE GERMAN SHEPHERD DOG CLUB OF 
AMERICA, http://gsdca.org/german-shepherd-dogs/choosing-a-puppy/good-buyer-
good-breeder (last visited Oct. 8, 2012). 
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highlight the dogs’ herding, tracking, agility, and obedience 
capacities that render it particularly fit for police work.292 
The club also has its own breeding code of ethics.293 
Although German Shepherds and American Belgian 
Malinois make up the majority of dogs used by law 
enforcement for detection tasks, since 1976 the United 
States Air Force has been training smaller breeds for 
similar work.294 Examples of these breeds include beagles 
and cocker spaniels, which have the “advantage of easily 
searching closed spaces that were inaccessible to German 
shepherd[s].”295  
In summary, the nature of detection dogs—in fact, their 
very genotype and phenotype—are the result of a long and 
detailed process of co-evolution.296 As STS scholars have 
noted in other contexts, “[p]edigrees documented a direct 
  
 292. See AMERICAN BELGIAN MALINOIS CLUB, 
http://www.malinoisclub.com/abmc/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2012); Breeder Code of 
Ethics, AMERICAN BELGIAN MALINOIS CLUB (ABMC), 
http://www.malinoisclub.com/abmc/abmc-breeder-information/abmc-breeder-
code-of-ethics (last visited Oct. 8, 2012). 
 293. Breeder Code of Ethics, supra note 292. The club’s website lists a few 
ways to identify a reputable breeder: mother and father over two years old, 
copies of all health clearances, pictures, and references of a three-generation 
pedigree, buyer screening, production of a written contract, and experience or 
knowledge of the breed. See Identify a Reputable Breeder, AMERICAN BELGIAN 
MALINOIS CLUB, http://www.malinoisclub.com/abmc/abmc-breeder-
information/identify-a-reputable-breeder (last visited Oct. 8, 2012). 
 294. See USDA Manual, supra note 226, at C-1-3. 
 295. Id. at C-1-3, C-1-7. Beyond the use of detection dogs for policing purposes,  
the USDA has also used dogs to detect screwworm infestations in cattle 
and the presence of brown tree snakes in aircraft. Australian shepherds 
have been used to indicate when cows are fertile so that farmers can 
breed them at the right time during their short estrus. Beagles are 
increasingly used to precisely locate termites in buildings to avoid the 
necessity of treating the entire structure. . . . Dogs have been used to 
perform ecological studies of wildlife by indicating on the scats of 
specific animals, demonstrating that certain species are present in an 
area under study.  
Id. at C-1-6. 
 296. DONNA HARAWAY, THE COMPANION SPECIES MANIFESTO: DOGS, PEOPLE, AND 
SIGNIFICANT OTHERNESS 29 (2003). 
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lineal connection to the landscape in its primordiality and 
the telos that made a dog anything but accidental.”297  
VI. COTRAINING K-9S AND HANDLERS 
Dogs and humans are not only coproduced through 
breeding; they are also actively trained to affect each other’s 
behaviors. This Part discusses such coproduction through 
training. According to the Oxford Dictionary, training is 
“the action of teaching a person or animal a particular skill 
or type of behaviour.”298 Dogs are increasingly taught to 
detect a variety of substances. In this sense, they are 
substantially different from machines, which are 
“programmed” rather than “trained.” At the same time, the 
scientific involvement in producing the dog sniff event and 
the extraction of particular knowledge from this event also 
make the dog into a technology. Detection dogs work closely 
with their human partners in law enforcement—the latter 
referred to as “handlers”—and are often rigorously trained 
and managed to properly fulfill their duties.  
Philosopher Jacques Derrida writes that during the last 
two centuries, human-animal relations have been 
dominated by “forms of knowledge, which remain 
inseparable from techniques of intervention into their 
object, [and] from the transformation of the actual object . . . 
namely, the living animal.”299 The production of such forms 
of knowledge about canine behavior in this context enables 
the training of both humans and dogs. Through examining 
this training in the context of the dog-handler-trainer-
breeder assemblage, this Part highlights the tensions that 
exist between the dog’s identity as a natural entity that 
shares an intimate relationship with humans and the dog’s 
identity as a technology—scientifically bred, trained, and 
interpreted by humans for surveillance ends.  
In my interview with a canine police officer, the officer 
commented that dogs are less fallible than machines. “At 
the end of the day,” he said, “the dog is a dog. It’s not a 
  
 297. Wallen, supra note 257, at 141. 
 298. Definition of Training, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/training (last visited Oct. 
22, 2012). 
 299. See Wallen, supra note 257, at 126 (discussing Jacques Derrida’s account 
of two centuries of human-animal relations) (emphasis omitted).  
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machine. It’s not subject to fail like the belt system on the 
machine. This is an amazing animal.”300 As I have shown, 
some courts have treated dog sniffs similarly as removed 
from human error and as belonging to their own, sui 
generis, natural category. The following subparts will 
demonstrate that in reality, the dogs’ detection skills are 
intimately linked with those of their human handlers, in the 
same way that any complex technology is dependent on the 
skills of its operators. Whether highly or poorly trained, 
detection dogs are actively produced. In this sense, too, dogs 
are a biotechnology. 
A. K-9 Training Institutions in the United States 
The police dog is trained to assist the police with their 
work.301 Federal, state, and municipal police have each 
developed their own organizations, centers, and methods for 
training detection dogs. There are currently at least thirty-
one state police K-9 associations and twenty-three regional 
and national level police K-9 associations.302 A number of 
government agencies train dogs specifically to detect drugs, 
including the United States Department of Defense, the 
United States Department of Agriculture—Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS), and the 
United States Customs Service.303 Outside of the federal 
government, “[the Auburn University program] is the 
largest K-9 research program in the United States.”304 
Auburn has “twenty-five trainers, who supply about one 
hundred dogs a year to Amtrak, Federal Protective Services, 
and police departments around the country.”305  
  
 300. Interview with anonymous canine officer (June 19, 2012). 
 301. See Obtaining and Selecting Dogs for Police Work, U.S. POLICE CANINE 
ASS’N, http://www.uspcak9.com/training/canineselection.html (last visited June 
1, 2012).  
 302. See Associations, EDEN CONSULTING GROUP, 
http://www.policek9.com/html/associations.html (last visited May 31, 2012).  
 303. See USDA Manual, supra note 226, at 1-1-5, C-1-2 to C-1-3. 
 304. Canine Detection Research Institute—CDRI, AUBURN U. C. VETERINARY 
MED., http://www.vetmed.auburn.edu/cdri (last visited May 31, 2012). 
 305. Bilger, supra note 1, at 54.  
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The average cost of basic K-9 training is $21,000, which 
includes ten weeks of lessons for the handler.306 There is 
even a police K-9 magazine and Web site, replete with K-9 
apparel that includes bite sleeves for $95 each,307 
“temperature monitoring/alert system” for K-9 vehicles for 
$849,308 and a K-9 BSD 2, which is a “remote-controlled 
device designed to eject a variety of motivational toys to a 
short distance, creating prey for [training dogs],” for $627.309 
The following few paragraphs will focus on New York State 
as an example of the use of police dogs at the state level.  
The New York State Police created the Division of 
Canine Unit in 1975.310 Initially, three troopers received the 
specialized training for canine handlers and were assigned 
to canines purchased from the United States Army for 
$10,000.311 These first few canines were initially used as 
explosives detection dogs in preparation for the 1980 Winter 
Olympic Games in Lake Placid, New York.312 New York 
police chose the Baltimore Police Department as its training 
agency.313 At the time, Baltimore had one of the largest 
canine units in the United States and was experimenting 
with what was later referred to as the “Baltimore Method” 
of training.314 Still quite popular, the Baltimore Method 
“dictate[s] that the canines be sociable, that they be allowed 
  
 306. Id. 
 307. Bite Suit Arm Sleeve, POLICE K-9 MAG., 
http://onlinestore.policek9magazine.net/products/BITE-SUIT-ARM-
SLEEVE.html (last visited May 31, 2012). 
 308. Premier Canine System™ by Criminalistics, Inc., POLICE K-9 MAG., 
http://onlinestore.policek9magazine.net/products/Premier-Canine-System™-by-
criminalistics%2C-Inc.html (last visited May 31, 2012). 
 309. K9 Behavior Shaping Device BSD2, POLICE K-9 MAG., 
http://onlinestore.policek9magazine.net/products/K9-Behavior-Shaping-Device-
BSD-2.html (last visited May 31, 2012). 
 310. Canine Unit, N.Y. ST., DIV. OF ST. POLICE, CANINE UNIT, available at 
http://www.troopers.ny.gov/Specialized_Services/Canine_Unit/ (last visited May 
31, 2012). 
 311. Id. That the police purchased these dogs from the military further 
demonstrates the strong interconnections between army dogs and police dogs 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
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around the general public, and that they reside in the 
handlers[’] residence[s].”315  
In 1978, the Division of State Police started training its 
own canines, and in 2000 the Canine Unit settled into a 
state-of-the-art training facility in Cooperstown, New 
York.316 According to its website, New York’s canine unit 
currently has sixty-six teams, including “thirty-one 
explosives detection canine teams, thirty-two narcotics 
detection canine teams, and three bloodhound teams,” 
utilized exclusively for tracking.317 All canines are donated 
to the unit at no cost “through Humane Societies, private 
citizens, and breeders from across the northeast.”318 These 
canines are then subject to a rigorous screening process that  
identifies the most suitable dogs for the twenty-week “Basic 
Handler School.”319 During this period, “a new handler and 
a[n] untrained canine are teamed together and undergo a 
strenuous program during which the teams are instructed 
in: basic obedience, agility, handler protection, either 
narcotics or explosives detection, tracking, building 
searches, veterinary first aid, and land navigation—map 
and compass course.”320 After completing this training, the 
dog-human teams are sent out on patrol and must receive 
biannual recertification.321 The following paragraphs explore 
the nature of this coproduced human-dog team by drawing 
on an example of dog detection cotraining by the USDA. 
  
 315. Id.  
 316. Id. 
 317. Id.  
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id.  The Canine Unit website contains fantastic images of all its K-9 
officers. New York State Canine Unit Photo Gallery, DIV. ST. POLICE,  
http://www.troopers.ny.gov/Specialized_Services/Canine_Unit/Canine_Gallery/ 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2012).  
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B. The Human-Dog Team 
Canine teams consist of a dog and handler, or canine 
enforcement officer, working as partners.322 As of 2012, 
approximately 630 canine teams were employed by the 
United States Customs Service at airports, seaports, and 
border checkpoints. These teams have all been certified 
following a rigorous training course.323 As Robert Bird 
explains, the training course of custom service dogs allows 
no room for error, accounting for the low number of teams 
that pass: 
Custom Service dogs are trained to disregard potential 
distractions such as food, harmless drugs, and residual scents. 
Agents present distractions such as loud gunshots during 
training, rewarding the dogs when those diversions are ignored. 
The teams must complete a certification exam in which the dog 
and handler must detect marijuana, hashish, heroin, and cocaine 
in a variety of environments. This exam and the following annual 
re-certifications must be completed perfectly, with no false alerts 
and no missed drugs. If a dog and handler team alerts 
erroneously, the team must undergo remedial training. If the 
team fails again, the team is disbanded and the dog is 
permanently relieved from duty.
324
  
In what follows, I mainly draw on the USDA training 
guidelines to explore in detail the process of human-dog 
training.325 Although police training differs in certain 
respects from training by the USDA, they share similar 
assumptions and common detection goals.  
  
 322. JOHN E. PARMETER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE FOR THE 
SELECTION OF DRUG DETECTORS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT APPLICATIONS 21 (2000) 
[hereinafter NIJ GUIDE]. 
 323. Id. at 21, 23.  
 324. Bird, supra note 66, at 414-15. 
 325. I chose to focus on the USDA training manual because it was publicly 
available; I was unable to obtain detailed police training manuals, probably 
because such manuals are considered a trade secret by the United States 
government. See, e.g., About US K-9 Unlimited, USK9 UNLIMITED, 
http://www.usk9.com/about.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (claiming to use 
proprietary techniques that have been deemed a trade secret by the United 
States government); see also Bird, supra note 66, at 421 (“Formal training 
manuals may detail training procedures. However, producing portions of the 
manual in court may not be possible since it would compromise investigative 
techniques.”). 
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USDA-APHIS, working with United States Customs, 
began a detector dog program in 1984 in Los Angeles.326 This 
program consisted of a single canine team, a beagle and a 
handler, situated at the Los Angeles International 
Airport.327 Two years later, APHIS coordinated with the 
military’s existing detector dog training program at 
Lackland Air Force Base to expand and train canine teams 
for service with the USDA.328 This early training course was 
mostly modeled after the Air Force’s methods, but APHIS 
began training its own teams at regional centers in 1988. 329 
By 1997, program growth and changing training methods 
led to the creation of the National Detector Dog Training 
Center, which currently provides trained detector dogs not 
only to major ports across the United States, but also “to 
mail facilities, land border crossings, and ports that handle 
cargo.”330  
The use of detection dogs by law enforcement agencies 
is expanding rapidly. For example, the USDA’s vision 
statement states that it  seeks to “deploy detector dogs in all 
areas where they can be most effectively utilized and 
integrated into the operations of APHIS and the PPQ” 
(Plant Protection Quarantine) and to “[successfully 
integrate the detector dog activity into the agricultural 
quarantine inspection operation,” including: “baggage 
clearance at airports, maritime ports, ships, and military 
facilities; international mail and small parcel clearance; 
bulk and containerized cargo clearance at airports and 
maritime ports; vehicle, cargo, and baggage clearance at 
land border crossings; and smuggling interdiction in all 
venues.”331  
The USDA provides concrete examples of how dogs are 
coproduced and codisciplined into desired behaviors.332 Its 
Basic Canine Officer Training Course is mandatory for all 
  
 326. USDA Manual, supra note 226, at 1-1-4 to 1-1-5. 
 327. Id. at 1-1-4. 
 328. Id. at 1-1-5. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id.  
 331. Id. at 1-1-6; see also id. at 1-1-2. 
 332. See id. at 4-1-1 to 4-1-11. 
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canine officers.333 The course lasts ten weeks and is 
structured “to accommodate various pathways . . . including 
passenger clearance, cargo control, and border control.”334 
The manual describes the goals of each week’s training 
program.335 During the first week, the “[s]tudents learn the 
basic terminology necessary for discussing canine structures 
relevant to scent detection work (i.e., olfactory apparatus) 
and health (e.g., hips, spine, other skeletal landmarks, 
placement of internal organs).”336 This is important because 
“[m]astering this terminology is necessary for precise 
communication about canine health, maintenance, and 
handling directions.”337 Also during the first week students 
learn  
[T]he basics of canine behavior, which is the foundation for all 
training. This training component covers fundamental concepts 
relating to canine behavior (e.g., behavioral tendencies, instincts, 
requirements, treatment, types of conditioning and learning, 
reward schedules, and motivation) as they apply to handling a 
scent detection canine and troubleshooting performance-related 
difficulties. Time is devoted to sharpening students’ abilities to 
observe and analyze canine behavior, emphasizing skills that will 
help them keep their detector dogs safe, healthy, and working 
proficiently.
338
 
At the end of the first week of training, handlers are paired 
with their actual dogs. “Students begin their new 
relationships with their detector dogs by learning how to 
establish a rapport. Activities include hands-on experience 
such as grooming their dogs (e.g., bathing, cleaning ears, 
and trimming nails).”339  
Next, from week two through five, a human-canine 
relationship is fostered and established:340  
  
 333. Id. at 4-1-1.  
 334. Id. 
 335. See id. at 4-1-1 to 4-1-11. 
 336. Id. at 4-1-3. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. 
 339. USDA Manual, supra note 226, at 4-1-3.  
 340. See id. at 4-1-4. 
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Students learn to observe their dogs to determine what rewards 
are most likely to elicit or enhance their strong desire, persistence, 
and enthusiasm to work. . . .  Although the standard reward is 
food, some dogs perform most effectively when food is combined 
with other types of rewards or reinforcers (e.g., towel, ball, etc.). 
Students . . . use this information to create a meaningful reward 
system for their detector dogs.
341
  
Clearly, information is not helpful in the abstract; it must 
be situated—and here, based on the peculiarities of each 
dog. Although not mentioned explicitly in the USDA 
manual, such situated knowledge should also be based on 
the concrete strengths and weaknesses of the dog’s human 
handler. 
The importance of a bidirectional (or human-dog) 
learning system is articulated explicitly by Auburn 
University’s Canine Detection Research Institute. The 
institute’s training and education Web page states, in 
particular, that: 
As part of a university, we provide state-of-the-art teaching 
methodologies to ensure that our clients receive not only the most 
educated dogs, but the best educated handlers possible. These 
teaching methods not only focus on our human counter parts, but 
also on our canine partners. We recognize that it is vital to both 
humans and canines to present advanced information in a manner 
that it can quickly and easily be learned. By focusing on the 
education of the dog and the handler, we can eliminate weak links 
and maximize the strengths of our canine handler teams.
342
 
Indeed, “[p]erforming a canine narcotics search requires 
much more than a person to keep the dog on the leash while 
it sniffs for drugs.”343 Instead, “dog and trainer work closely 
together as a team.”344 The United States Air Force Court of 
Military Review summarized dog and handler teamwork as 
follows: 
  
 341. Id.; see also Oregon v. Foster, 252 P.3d 292, 295, 296 (Or. 2011) 
(discussing how officers trained their dogs to detect drugs through playing 
games with tennis balls). 
 342. Training and Education, AUBURN UNIV. CANINE VETERINARY MED., 
http://www.vetmed.auburn.edu/cdri/cdri-services/training-and-education (last 
visited May 30, 2012). 
 343. Bird, supra note 66, at 422. 
 344. Id. 
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Clearly, the dog and handler function as an integral team. The 
dog is the sensor, and the handler is the trainer and interpreter. 
The handler’s performance in both roles is inseparably 
intertwined with the dog’s overall reliability rate. And since the 
net result is the product of the interaction between two living 
beings, both roles of the handler are highly subjective.
345 
 
From weeks two to five of USDA’s training program, the 
human students learn how to use their voice.346 In the 
language of the manual: “Quality, pitch, and tone of voice 
convey meaningful information to dogs. Students learn the 
importance of consistency in their use of words, and to 
identify the effects of different voice qualities.”347 The 
manual also details that: 
Once they master the basic presentation skills, [the students] are 
introduced to [practical search] techniques that are meant to 
enhance work efficiency with their detector dogs. These 
techniques include the following: 
1. Search Patterns—How to move a dog and move with a dog 
around typical obstacles and luggage to maximize coverage 
of the search. 
2. Breathing Bags—How to assist a dog in detecting odors 
within luggage by pushing air out of the bags at the 
appropriate time. 
3. Tap Backs—How to provide a dog a second chance to 
examine a piece of luggage without interrupting the flow of 
the search. 
  
 345. Id. (quoting  United States v. Paulson, 2 M.J. 326, 330 n.5 (A.F.C.M.R. 
1976), remanded by 7 M.J. 43 (C.M.A. 1979). The importance of the particular 
handler-dog bond was emphasized by the respondent in Florida v. Harris, who 
suggested that this should be the major ground for finding Aldo’s sniff in that 
case unreliable:  
And we have to remember that this certificate, not only was it 16 
months out of date, it wasn’t a certificate for Aldo. It was a certificate 
for Aldo and a Seminole County deputy together as a team.  
This dog was never certified as part of a team with Officer Wheetley in 
this case. And the certifications in this area are team certifications, not 
individual certifications.  
Transcript of Oral Argument, Harris, supra note 168, at 32. 
 346. See USDA Manual, supra note 226, at 4-1-4, 4-1-6. 
 347. Id. at 4-1-6. 
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4. Pinpointing—How to induce a dog to be specific when 
indicating on an odor source either by touching with its nose 
or with its paw.
348
 
As this passage makes clear, detection dogs do not work 
alone. Their human handlers move through spaces 
alongside them, blowing air out of luggage at appropriate 
moments (also called “burping”349) and providing second 
sniffing opportunities when deemed necessary.350 At its best, 
the dog detection work is not a technical or mechanical 
process that occurs without human interference. In fact, 
good detection work requires an intimate relationship 
between the dog and its handler, including cross-species 
interpretive skills: “Handlers interpret their dogs’ signals, 
and the handler alone makes the final decision whether a 
dog has detected narcotics.”351 A canine officer explained to 
me along these lines that “the dog doesn’t know that people 
usually keep their drugs in glove compartments or places 
like that—and this is where my experience steps in. I have 
to always think: why did she behave a little differently 
here?”352 Human handlers affect the work of dogs as much 
as the dogs’ capacities and incapacities affect human work.  
Finally, in weeks six through nine of the USDA’s 
training course, dogs and humans move to work in “real” 
environments.353 According to the manual, “[t]he training 
occurs at an international airport, an international border, 
or an international cargo receiving area that closely 
simulates the environment in which the detector dog teams 
will eventually work.”354 Not only are the human handlers 
trained to modify their behavior according to their dogs; 
dogs, too, are trained rigorously during the course to 
respond to their handlers’ instincts rather than their own. 
For example, one trainer told the New Yorker: “We have to 
have an animal that’s willing to consummate its aggression 
on a living, breathing human, then contain it enough to 
  
 348. Id. at 4-1-7.  
 349. See interview with anonymous canine officer, supra note 300. 
 350. See USDA Manual, supra note 226, at 4-1-7. 
 351. See Bird, supra note 66, at 425. 
 352. See interview with anonymous canine officer, supra note 300. 
 353. See USDA Manual, supra note 226, at 4-1-7. 
 354. Id.  
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come back to you. . . . That’s a lot to ask of any being, much 
less a dog.”355 At the same time, dog and handler must 
modify their behaviors to fit the relevant spatial setting in 
which they both operate.356 Donna Haraway’s words in the 
general context of working dogs are thus highly relevant 
also here:  
Dogs’ roles have been multifaceted, and they have not been 
passive raw material to the action of others. Further, dogs have 
not been unchangeable animals confined to supposedly ahistorical 
order of nature. Nor have people emerged unaltered from the 
interactions. Relations are constitutive; dogs and people are 
emergent as historical beings, as subjects and objects to each 
other precisely through the verbs of their relating.
357
  
People and dogs, Haraway contends, are “mutually 
adapted partners in . . . naturecultures.”358 Scent detection 
dogs are, by definition, products of their breeding and 
training by humans.  
C. Are Dogs Infallible? Additional Human Influences on 
Dog Alerts 
Alongside the formal dog-handler training, there is 
another way in which humans—and handlers in 
particular—affect the operation of their dogs. As 
acknowledged by Justice Souter in his important dissent in 
Caballes,359 the Florida Supreme Court in Jardines360 and 
Harris,361 and the Oregon Supreme Court in Foster362 and 
Helzer363—dogs are not infallible. They may produce “false 
alerts,”364 not only in response to their handlers’ 
  
 355. Bilger, supra note 1, at 52.  
 362. See USDA Manual, supra note 226, at 4-1-7. 
 357. HARAWAY 2008, supra note 194, at 62. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410-16 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 360. Florida v. Jardines, 73 So. 3d 34, 40 (Fla. 2011). 
 361. Harris v. Florida, 71 So. 3d 756, 771-72 (Fla. 2011).  
 362. Oregon v. Foster, 252 P.3d 292, 297-300 (Or. 2011). 
 363. Oregon v. Helzer, 252 P.3d 288, 289-91 (Or. 2011). 
 364. Or, in other words, a “false positive.” See Jeff Weiner, Police K-9’s and the 
Constitution: What Every Lawyer and Judge Should Know, THE NAT’L ASS’N OF 
CRIM. DEF. LAW., Apr. 2012, at 23. Every dog alert has four possible outcomes: a 
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unintentional cues,365 but also because of residual or trace 
odors that linger on an object, even though it has never 
actually touched an illegal drug.366 In the oral arguments in 
Florida v. Harris, the respondent argued along these lines:  
And we know from the studies that have been cited in the briefs 
that there are other reasons that dogs alert when that alert 
  
dog positively alerts and drugs are found; a dog does not alert and no drugs are 
present (these two first outcomes are “correct”); failing to alert when drugs are 
present (a “false negative”); and alerting when drugs are not present (a “false 
positive”). See Bird, supra note 66, at 427.  
365. Based on interviews with investigators from narcotic divisions, Robert Bird 
concludes that “[i]n fact, almost all erroneous alerts originate not from the dog, 
but from the handler’s misinterpretation of the dog’s signals.” Bird, supra note 
66, at 422, 422 n.124. Bird adds:  
Canines often have their own particular pattern for communicating an 
alert. If a handler is not aware of a dog’s particular behavior, she may 
mistake an indication of narcotics for a reaction to food, another 
animal, or other distraction. Skilled handlers also receive training for a 
specific type of substance or environment, and should pass annual 
recertification tests.  
Id. at 423.  
Finally, Bird notes that,  
[t]rained handlers often train and remain with one canine in practice, 
developing a close bond with the dog and a keen eye for interpreting 
that particular canine’s habits.  
Handlers must also know how to avoid “handler cues.” Handler cues 
are conscious or unconscious signals given from the handler that can 
lead a detection dog to where the handler thinks drugs are located. 
These voice or physical signals can compromise a dog’s objectivity and 
impermissibly lead the dog to alert at the suspected item or person. 
Handler cues can be corrected in training by conducting practice sniffs 
where both the dog and handler do not know where the drugs are 
located. 
Id. at 423-24. 
 366. Weiner, supra note 364, at 22-23. A recent study found that 
approximately 90% of all paper money circulating in the United States contains 
traces of cocaine; this situation presents additional challenges to police detection 
work. See David Biello, Cocaine Contaminates Majority of U.S. Currency, SCI. 
AM. (Aug. 16, 2009), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=cocaine-
contaminates-majority-of-american-currency. According to the canine officer I 
interviewed, however, there is no such thing as a false alert. See interview with 
anonymous canine officer, supra note 300. He explained that the dog is trained 
to detect odor, not actual drugs, and that it is thus practically impossible to 
prove that there was no odor present. Id. 
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cannot be verified. Handler cueing is identified as the chief one. 
And simply dogs make mistakes. Dogs err. Dogs get excited and 
will alert to things like tennis balls in trunks or animals, that sort 
of thing.
367
 
According to the Chicago Tribune, “analysis of three years 
of data for suburban departments found that only 44 
percent of those alerts by the dogs led to the discovery of 
drugs or paraphernalia. For Hispanic drivers, the success 
rate was just 27 percent.”368 The Tribune continues:  
Even advocates for the use of drug-sniffing dogs agree with 
experts who say many dog-and-officer teams are poorly trained 
and prone to false alerts that lead to unjustified searches. Leading 
a dog around a car too many times or spending too long examining 
a vehicle, for example, can cause a dog to give a signal for drugs 
where there are none.369  
Clearly, human conduct affects K-9s far beyond what is 
prescribed by their formal cotraining, and in spite of the 
ideal that they should operate in a way that is unaffected by 
human cues. Nevertheless, in most states “dog teams are 
not held to any statutory standard of performance” or 
certification.370  
  
 367. Transcript of Oral Argument, Harris, supra note 168, at 41. 
 368. Dan Hinkel & Joe Mahr, Drug Dogs Often Wrong, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 2011, 
at 1.  
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. But see Police Dog Training Standards, EDEN CONSULTING GROUP, 
http://www.policek9.com/html/standards.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2012) 
(discussing varying standards in Arizona, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, and Utah). Additionally, the United States Police Canine Association 
recently published its Certification Rules and Regulations. Certification Rules 
and Regulations, U.S. POLICE CANINE ASS’N INC. (2012), available at 
http://www.uspcak9.com/certification/USPCARulebook2012.pdf. The Association 
places several requirements on both dogs and handlers. For example, handlers 
are required to maintain total control over their dogs at all times; they must  
use the briefest commands possible; and their use of a dog’s name before 
instruction is defined as a “double command” and penalized as such. See id. at 3.  
Agility tests required for certification include hurdles, catwalk, broad jump, A-
frame, and crawl. Id. at 4. These tests are completed based on the tester’s choice 
of picket fence, chain link fence, simulated brick wall, windows, boards, or 
shrubs. Id. at 5. Tests also include evidence searches from a selection of shotgun 
shells, matches, credit cards, key ring with a tab, and a metal gun, screwdriver, 
or piece of leather. Id. at 6. A key evaluation component is the dog’s “alert,” 
which is rated based on how it can confidently, obviously, and consistently 
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In light of this troubling data, Robert Bird recommends 
four important issues for courts to consider when assessing 
the reliability of a narcotics training dog: 1) the amount of 
training “required to produce a reliable drug dog”; 2) the 
skills that “an effective dog handler should know”; 3) how to 
scrutinize a canine’s accuracy rate; and 4) the conditions 
under which dogs sniffs are most reliable.371  
Court assessments vary. There are instances when the 
courts have reviewed canine alerts that have proven “highly 
effective, with many dogs maintaining a near perfect record 
of narcotics detection.” In contrast, some judges have 
omitted training and reliability from their evaluations, 
resulting in the approval of dogs that produce erroneous 
alerts and thereby unnecessary invasions of privacy.372 Bird 
also notes that settled judicial standards concerning dogs’ 
reliability are absent and that court analysis rarely focuses 
on handlers, although it should.373 Although not framed in 
these terms, Bird’s study is in line with the broader 
argument of this Article that the dog does not function 
irrespective of the long history of its material and 
behavioral coproduction and that each and every detail of 
the dog’s operations is formed and circumscribed by 
humans.  
VII. K-9S FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF LAW ENFORCERS 
A. K-9s as Members of the Police Family—And as Machines 
I have shown that police detection dogs are not simply 
natural entities that sniff around suspect cars in the same 
way that pet dogs sniff their tuna sandwich at home. That 
is, they do not operate absent human influence but are, 
  
distinguish an indication from a nonindication. See id. at 14. However, the 
various industry standards are neither uniform nor mandatory across the board. 
See, e.g., United States v. Prokupek, 2009 WL 2634446, at *22 (D. Neb. Aug. 24, 
2009) (considering the defendant’s claim that Nebraska's training standards and 
methods are inferior to the common standards by respected K-9 associations, the 
court held: “There is more than one way to train a dog”). 
 371. Bird, supra note 66, at 407-08. 
 372. See id. at 407; see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 726 F.2d 661, 663-64 
(10th Cir. 1984) (disregarding anomalous behavior by narcotics detection dog in 
alert process). 
 373. See Bird, supra note 66, at 415-20.  
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ideally, rigorously and continuously trained. At the same 
time, the prevalent police training model encourages 
handlers to raise their K-9s at home, like other members of 
the family. 374 This highlights the natural, or the biological, 
properties of dogs.  
The notion of K-9s as family members—and as equal 
members in the police family in particular—is most 
prominent during times of tragedy. Here, for example, is an 
excerpt from a eulogy by an officer who lost his canine in 
line of service: “Last Friday morning, tragedy struck my 
family. . . . It’s a love and a bond only canine handlers can 
understand.”375 Another officer commented about his canine: 
“Bach was an officer. He worked just as hard, and he needs 
to be remembered just as much.”376 A third officer described 
the death of K-9 Rocky because the dog’s handler, Craig, 
was too upset to speak: “He was Craig’s partner, he was 
Craig’s defender, but far more important, he was Craig’s 
friend.”377 Finally, news headlines described: “Nitro the 
police dog receives a hero’s sendoff.” The item read, further:  
“Nitro we will miss you. The city is yours pal,” said an emotional 
Sgt. Norm Webster. Nitro lost his life in the line of duty on Jan. 23 
[2006] while pursuing a suspected car thief who attempted to 
escape onto a stationary train. Nitro followed, and at the very 
moment the dog attempted to leap onto the train, it began to 
move. Nitro then slipped from the car and was run over by the 
train. Those gathered at the funeral gave him a hero’s sendoff. “I 
regret we lost Nitro in the manner that we did,” said Inspector 
Dean Robinson of the Vancouver Police Department. “We lost one 
of our own. He wasn’t just a dog, He was a loyal and dedicated 
  
 374. Or, more precisely, like near members. See id. at 412 n.55 (“A handler 
living with their detection dog at home should not treat them as ordinary pets. 
If pampered, the dogs will be less desirous to please their handler for rewards 
on the job. This desire is important, because their reward system is primarily 
based on praise and affection.”) (citing Interview with Dennis L. Trombley, 
Member of the Rhode Island State Police K-9 Unit, in North Kingstown, R.I. 
(July 12, 1995)). Typically, after eight or nine years of service, the dog retires to 
a full pet status with his or her handler. Id. at 414.  
 375. See Moxley, supra note 254.  
 376. Beloved Florissant Police K9 Dies, CBS ST. LOUIS (Apr. 16, 2012), 
http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2012/04/16/beloved-florissant-police-k9-dies/.  
 377. Rich Newberg, Law Enforcement Mourns Loss of K9 Rocky, WIVB.COM 
(Dec. 5, 2011, 5:42 PM), http://www.wivb.com/dpp/news/crime/law-enforcement-
mourns-loss-of-k9-rocky.  
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member of the department and he had a police identification 
number to prove it.
378
 
These accounts illustrate the dog’s capacity to develop 
intimate relationships with humans.379  
Alongside the officers’ references to their K-9s as family 
and friends, K-9s are often referred to by their human 
coworkers as machines or technologies:  
Canine police tend to talk about their dogs as if they were 
mechanical devices. They describe them as tools or technology and 
say that they’re “building dogs” through proper training. They say 
that their animals need ‘maintenance’ to be “fully operational,” 
and that a “dual-purpose dog”—one that has been taught to both 
chase down criminals and detect drugs or explosives—has 
“superior functionality.”
380
 
Along these lines, a canine officer tells me that “the dog 
is accurate; always.”381 He explains: “I don’t believe that the 
dog has his off days. It is a living tool for tracing people and 
articles. It’s a locating tool, an extension of what we can do 
as police officers, like a crowbar or pepper spray.”382  
Despite their ostensible juxtaposition, the two notions—
that of dogs as part of the police family and man’s best 
friend, and that of dogs as a manmade instruments serving 
human detection ends—are deeply intertwined and 
codependent. These concepts are part and parcel of an 
  
 378. Nitro the Police Dog Receives a Hero’s Sendoff, AR15.COM, 
http://beta.ar15.com/archive/topic.html?b=1&f=5&t=434869 (last visited Nov. 
26, 2012). 
 379. Another, older example is that of Nemo, the first sentry dog to be sent 
home to the United States from Vietnam. See ENGLISH, supra note 276, at 24; 
WAR STORIES, available at http://www.war-stories.com/aspprotect/pdf/377th-tsn-
a2c-robert-a-throneburg-k9-nemo-a534-1966.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2012); In 
December 1966, Nemo and his handler were patrolling in Vietnam. ENGLISH, 
supra note 276, at 24. Nemo attacked after detecting a group of Viet Cong 
infiltrators. Id. Subsequently, both Nemo and his handler were wounded. 
Although Nemo lost his eye, he continued to serve out his term in Vietnam, and 
is best known for saving his handler’s life. Id. On November 15, 2005, a 
monument was dedicated to Nemo at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas. See 
WAR STORIES, supra note 379. 
 380. Bilger, supra note 1, at 50.  
 381. See interview with anonymous canine officer, supra note 300. 
 382. See id.  
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increasingly complex human-animal fusion. Although the 
surveillance context is a rather recent development in this 
relationship, it nonetheless fits within the wider historical 
context of breeding practices, the emergence of nationalism, 
and scientific progress—to name just a few of the themes 
that have influenced the current status of human-dog 
relations. 
B. K-9s and Electronic Drug Detectors 
Alongside drug detection by dogs, the Guide for the 
Selection of Drug Detectors for Law Enforcement 
Applications383 lists several central drug detectors: trace 
detection technologies384 (e.g., ion mobility spectrometry, or 
IMS385), bulk detection,386 and manual search techniques.387 
The guide compares trace and canine detection, concluding 
that “[t]hese two screening methods tend to have 
complementary strengths, so it is often advantageous to 
have both capabilities on hand and to use either or both 
  
 383. The United States Department of Justice’s Office of Law Enforcement 
Standards functions to “conduct research that will assist law enforcement and 
criminal justice agencies in the selection and procurement of quality 
equipment.” NIJ GUIDE, supra note 322, at iii.  
 384. Id. at 5. “Trace detection of an illicit drug refers to detecting the drug by 
collection and analysis of microscopic amounts of the drug. These microscopic 
quantities can be in the form of vapor, particulate, or both.” Id. “In principle, 
dogs can be trained to detect any type of drug. This versatility, combined with a 
dog’s superior mobility and its ability to follow a scent directly to the source, 
makes canine detection the method of choice for a variety of applications that 
have a significant search component.” Id. at 21.  
 385. Id. at 48. IMS “is a technique for the trace detection of drugs and other 
chemical compounds. In this technique, compounds are first ionized and then 
identified based on the time that it takes them to travel through a region with 
an applied electric field.” Id. Mass spectrometry is “a chemical analysis 
technique in which the molecules to be studied are first ionized and then 
separated and identified based on their charge-to-mass ratio. Mass spectrometry 
is performed under conditions of high vacuum in contrast to IMS which is 
performed at atmospheric pressure.” Id.  
 386. Id. at 25. “In bulk detection, a contraband substance is detected not from 
residual contamination but by the actual, macroscopic mass of the substance.” 
Id. 
 387. Id. at 37. “Manual search, also referred to as physical search, is a 
valuable contraband detection technique that can be used either alone or as a 
supplement to other detection methods.” Id. 
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depending upon the circumstances.”388 This demonstrates 
that machine and dog are regarded by the police as 
interdependent and inseparable. Moreover, new 
technologies have been developed modeled on law 
enforcement dogs so as to perform the same highly 
specialized tasks.389 This strong dog-machine correlation 
lends support to my argument that courts should treat 
police dogs, similarly, as a technology.  
In contrast, Mary Constantino treats dogs and 
machines as two separate technologies, claiming that 
“[r]ecently, technology has offered a replacement for man’s 
best friend.”390 She continues: “By examining trace evidence, 
technology can detect any number of illegal substances” 
that even a dog would be unable to detect.391 She 
demonstrates that “[e]lectronic sniffers are becoming 
increasingly popular in the law enforcement field. One of 
the main reasons for this is the benefits they offer over the 
traditional canine search.”392 Machines are preferable to 
dogs for a variety of reasons; one reason is cost efficiency:  
The cost of electronic sniffers, usually ranging between $20,000 
and $100,000, is more expensive than a canine, which typically 
costs between $3,000 and $10,000. However, the maintenance cost 
of a canine is generally higher than that of an electronic sniffer. 
With canines, it is necessary to train both the handler and the 
dog. The cost of care for a canine generally adds another $1,600 to 
the bill per year. This is not even including the salary for the 
handler.
393
  
With regard to cost, “[t]he Federal Aviation Administration 
has estimated that the cost of maintaining one properly 
trained officer-canine team at a major U.S. airport is 
approximately $165K per year.”394  
  
 388. Id. at 22.  
 389. See Lunney, supra note 37, at 896 (discussing the application of Kyllo and 
the development of mechanical sniffers). 
 390. Mary Constantino, Electronic Sniffers’ Place: The Use of Electronic 
Sniffers under the Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment, 2 
CHARLOTTE L. REV. 333, 335 (2010).  
 391. See id. at 335. 
 392. Id. at 345. 
 393. Id.; see also NIJ GUIDE, supra note 322, at 23 (discussing training costs).  
 394. NIJ GUIDE, supra note 322, at 23.  
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Additionally, Constantino maintains that machines are 
superior to dogs in that “a police dog can typically only work 
one hour before requiring a break. Electronic sniffers do not 
require breaks and ‘in principle, can operate 24 [hours] a 
day.’”395 Also, “no matter how well trained the dog is, there 
is a limit to how many types of drugs or explosives it can 
detect. Most law enforcement agencies only train dogs to 
detect the nine most common narcotics or explosives.”396 By 
contrast, “electronic sniffers can detect a large selection of 
narcotics, but also explosive and chemical agents. Another 
benefit of electronic sniffers is that they typically do not 
cause the same fear in individuals who are tested [as 
opposed to canines].”397   
At the same time, Constantino lists some of the 
advantages in using traditional canines for police work.398 
For example, “[t]he main advantage a dog has over 
electronic sniffers is its ability to trace a scent to its source. 
A dog cannot only indicate whether molecular amounts of 
drugs are present in the air but it also indicates the source 
of the drugs,” which electronic sniffers cannot do.399 In effect, 
canines are “the tool[s] of choice for law enforcement in 
areas containing significant search components [which 
cause an increase in the complexity of a search], meaning 
that are they are unlikely” to be replaced by electronic 
sniffers in the near future.400  
The effectiveness of canine detection in real-world 
settings is evident in the statistics generated by United 
States Customs. According to these statistics, between 
October 1996 and September 1997 canine detection led to 
more than 9200 seizures of narcotics and other dangerous 
drugs by the police.401 The seized materials were valued at 
$3.1 billion, including 417,672 pounds of marijuana, 48,238 
  
 395. Constantino, supra note 390, at 345 (citations omitted). 
 396. Id. 
 397. Id. at 345-46. 
 398. Id. at 346. 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. at 346.  
 401. Questions and Answers About the U.S. Customs Dogs, DOGPROBLEMS.COM, 
http://www.dogproblems.com/uncategorized/questions-and-answers-about-the-
us-customs-dogs/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
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pounds of cocaine, 335 pounds of hash oil, 326 pounds of 
heroin, and 213 pounds of opium.402 
C. K-9s—and Other Machines 
Alongside my focus throughout this Article on the dog 
itself as a fusion of technology and nature, the increasing 
use of advanced technologies that are installed onto the 
dogs’ bodies in the course of their routine police work also 
renders the nature/machine split quite impractical for 
assessing contemporary surveillance operations. Dogs are 
increasingly becoming hybrid animal-machines—or, in 
Donna Haraway’s terminology, cyborgs.403 For example, 
some have speculated that a dog from the Navy Seal’s elite 
dog team—armored with high-level machinery— 
parachuted with eighty human members into Afghanistan 
and was partly responsible for tracing Osama Bin Laden.404 
Closer to home, a video from the Autonomous Canine 
Navigation project shows a yellow Labrador moving through 
a bomb site wearing a headset and harness, with a 
  
 402. Id. 
 403. “A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a 
creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction. . . . By the late 
twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and 
fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs.” 
HARAWAY, supra note 197, at 149-50. 
 404. One reporter commented on the dog involved in the Bin Laden raid: 
Little is known about what may be the nation’s most courageous dog. 
Even its breed is the subject of great interest, although it was most 
likely a German shepherd or a Belgian Malinois, military sources say. 
But its use in the raid reflects the military’s growing dependence on 
dogs in war, in which improvised explosive devices have caused two-
thirds of all casualties. Dogs have proved far better than people or 
machines at quickly finding bombs.  
Gardinier Harris, A Bin Laden Hunter on Four Legs, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2011, 
at A16; see also A War Dog That Assisted in Assault on Bin Laden Might Have 
Been Trained at Auburn, WAR EAGLE READER, (May 5, 2011), available at 
http://www.thewareaglereader.com/2011/05/war-dog-that-assisted-in-assault-on-
bin-laden-might-have-been-trained-at-auburn/. The news item further reads: 
“Suzanne Belger, president of the American Belgian Malinois Club, said she was 
hoping the dog was one of her breed ‘and that it did its job and came home safe.’ 
But Laura Gilbert, corresponding secretary for the German Shepherd Dog Club 
of America, said she was sure the dog was her breed ‘because we’re the best!’” 
Harris, supra note 404. 
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computer, a video camera, a GPS and an accelerator, all 
operated remotely.405 And in New York City, police are 
experimenting with a remotely monitored infrared video 
camera mounted on a dog’s back. “The real technology here 
is the dog,” one of the implementing officers said.406  
CONCLUSION 
Florida v. Jardines sits at an interesting junction 
between two lines of precedents by the Court: Place, 
Caballes, and Edmond—which establish that a dog sniff is 
not a search—and Kyllo, Knotts, and Karo, which draw a 
“firm but also bright” line at the entrance to the house.407 
Soon, the Supreme Court Justices will need to decide which 
line of cases more strongly applies in this case: will the 
sanctity of the home trump centuries of dog-human 
camaraderie? 
 On the one hand, the Court will want to avoid granting 
K-9 police an absolute power to sniff around homes with no 
need for warrants or reasonable suspicion and will also 
want to be careful when using the products of such sniffs as 
sufficient grounds for a valid search warrant. On the other 
hand, the Court will want to use caution when interfering 
with routine police detection work, especially in what is 
perceived as a security-sensitive time. Although it has 
received much less attention, another case from the 
Sunshine State will soon be decided by the Supreme Court. 
This case, which concerns the reliability of dog sniffs, 
contests the Supreme Court’s previous assumption that the 
dog is infallible. 
  
 405. Bilger, supra note 1, at 55; see Action Videos, K9 STORM INC., 
http://www.k9storm.com/video.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2012). For an idea 
about the technological advancements used in the military, see Jennifer Viegas, 
A U.S. Navy Seals’ Secret Weapon: Elite Dog Team, DISCOVERY NEWS (May 2, 
2011, 6:47 PM), http://news.discovery.com/animals/a-us-navy-seals-secret-
weapon-elite-dog-team-110503.html; see also Winard Britt, A Software and 
Hardware System for the Autonomous Control and Navigation of a Trained 
Canine 27-28 (Aug. 10, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Auburn 
University), available at http://etd.auburn.edu/etd/bitstream/handle/10415/1800/ 
Dissertation.pdf?sequence=1. 
 406. Bilger, supra note 1, at 56.  
 407. United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2000).  
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This Article has presented an alternative framework for 
deciding the two Florida cases. First, I have shown the 
instability of the distinction between nature and technology 
drawn by courts in their Fourth Amendment cases. As part 
of this argument, I have also criticized the courts’ sui 
generis approach toward dogs, first established in Place. 
Unlike the machine, which is always suspected of being a 
“creeping” surveillance technology, courts have often treated 
the dog as innocuous and familiar and, hence, as incapable 
of substantially intruding into human privacy.  
The opposition between nature and technology, often 
criticized by social theorists, is now before the Supreme 
Court. The canine search cases invite the Court to develop a 
more nuanced view of nature by acknowledging that a police 
dog, although biological in many senses, is also manmade by 
virtue of its breeding, training, deployment, and 
interpretation by humans.  
By contrast to the prevailing judicial classification of 
the police dog as either a natural entity or a technology—
each triggering an opposite chain of legal events—I have 
suggested treating the police dog as a “biotechnology,” a 
technique of producing and using a biological entity that 
requires considerable expertise and expense. Although it 
seems that the dog has a limited development capacity in 
comparison to the nonorganic machine, the police dog’s 
improved breeding, training, application, and machine 
augmentation render it both a biological entity and an 
advancing technology.  
Moreover, although the American public commonly uses 
dogs as pets,408 a work dog—and a police detection dog in 
particular—is clearly not “in public use.” Specifically, the 
high cost of K-9 breeding and professional training, the 
unique handler-canine relationship that develops in the 
highly volatile police setting, and the status of K-9s as full 
members of the police force—all demonstrate that the police 
dog is not, and will probably never be, in such general 
public use.  
  
 408. Indeed, according to a 2012 survey, 62% of United States households 
owned a pet: 39% of households owned at least one dog and 33% of households 
owned at least one cat. See Industry Statistics and Trends, AM. PET PRODUCTS 
ASS'N, http://www.americanpetproducts.org/press_industrytrends.asp (last 
visited June 2, 2012). 
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Finally, this Article has argued that the hybrid category 
of “biotechnology” should trigger at least as much 
constitutional protection as an infrared device.409 Under no 
circumstances should any technology go a-priori 
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment, even when such 
technology is an eight-year-old chocolate Labrador Retriever 
named Franky. 
  
 409. In Place, Justice Brennan seemed to imply that due to the majority’s 
rulings, we may need to be more concerned about dogs than technology. See 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 719-20 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“The use of dogs. . . . implicates concerns that are at least as sensitive as those 
implicated by the use of certain [advanced technologies].”); United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 137-38 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court . . . 
may very well have paved the way for technology to override the limits of the 
law . . . .”). 
